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COMMENT 
CONSIDERING HYBRID SEX AND 
AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BY 
WOMEN: EXAMINING 
APPROACHES TO PLEADING AND 
ANALYSIS - A PRAGMATIC MODEL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many mid-life to older women face employment discrimina-
tion that does not fit easily into already existing categories un-
der the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("the 
ADEA") , or the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") because 
the discrimination often involves a fusion of both age and sex.l 
The discrimination cases brought by older women on the basis 
of age and sex, however, are scarcely consIdered by lawyers or 
courts as a single cause of action concerning the combination of 
sex-and-age bias.2 A recent study prepared by the Women's 
Legal Defense Fund ("WLDF Study") involved 335 cases alleg-
ing age and sex discrimination that spanned two decades and 
reported that women were the overwhelming majority of liti-
gants in those cases.3 Yet in only ten percent of the opinions 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994). 
2. See HELEN NORTON, et al, EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MIn-LIFE 
AND OLDER WOMEN: How COURTS TREAT SEX-ANn-AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES [here-
inafter "WLDF STUDV") (AARP, 1996). See id. at 2, 3,15. 
3. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 2, 3. The WLDF STUDY examined all pub-
lished and unpublished state and federal court opinions on cases involving sex and age 
discrimination claims between January I, 1976 and September 30, 1995, for a total of 
115 
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reviewed were the age and sex discrimination claims evaluated 
as combined discrimination.4 
One might therefore speculate that the problem of combined 
discrimination against older women as "older women" is slight, 
or has gone virtually unnoticed. However, a steadily increasing 
body of discourse has considered and found support for the 
proposition that older women face employment and societal 
discrimination that is separate and distinct from that of older 
men and younger women.5 The WLDF Study points to a long-
335 cases. See id. at 2. The WLDF STUDY did not include jury verdicts that were unac-
companied by a written decision, or out-of-court settlements. See id. at 1. Of the total 
cases reviewed, eighty-one percent of the claims were made by women, while sixteen 
percent involved male plaintiffs. See id. at 3. All other cases involved class actions or 
multiple plaintiffs of both sexes. See id. at 3. 
4. See id. at 2, 15. 
5. See generally, FRANCINE WEISS, OLDER WOMEN AND JOB DISCRIMINATION: A 
PRIMER (Older Women's League 1985), FRANCINE WEISS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION AGAINST OLDER WOMEN: A HANDBOOK ON LITIGATING AGE & SEX DIB-
CRIMINATION CASES (Older Women's League 1989); Howard C. Eglit, The Age Dis-
crimination in Empluyment Act at Thirty: Where Its Been, Where It Is Today, Where Its 
Going, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 605-12 (1997) [hereinafter "THIRTY YEARS UNDER THE 
ADEA"] (discussing the dramatic increase in women as plaintiffs under the ADEA and 
the increasing number of women in the demographics on older workers; suggesting a 
further increase in their participation under the ADEA); Patti Buchman, Note, Title 
VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anclwrwomen on the Basis of Age-
Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 195-203 (1985) (arguing that discrimina-
tion against television anchor women on the basis of age-related appearance is sex 
discrimination under Title VII); Izquierdo Priesto v. Mercado Rosa, 894 F.2d 467 (2nd 
Cir. 1983) (plaintiff alleged an Equal Protection violation on the basis of age and sex as 
a result of her termination and subsequent replacement by a younger woman where 
the employer claimed that it needed "new faces" and that plaintiffs replacement was 
"young, attractive and refreshing"); Haskins v. Secretary of HHS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 256 (W. D. Mo. 1984) (challenging employer policy to consider only that last 
ten years of experience when selecting employees for promotional opportunities be-
cause the practice had a disparate impact on older workers, particularly women who 
were more likely to interrupt their careers for family responsibilities); Judy Klemesrud, 
"If Your Face Isn't Young": Women Confront Problems of Aging, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1980, at A24 (discussing participants and programs at the opening session of a White 
House Mini-Conference on societal problems facing older women); Bob Levey, Loads of 
Bias If You're an Older Woman, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 1997, at C10 (discussing 
experiences of older women with employment discrimination); Sasha Sadan, KneBSet 
Panel Told of Amindar's Discrimination Against Older Women, JERUSALEM POST, 'Feb. 
15, 1994, at 3 (discussing claims by older Jerusalem women of being retired early be-
cause of their ages, despite government anti-discrimination law prohibiting such con-
duct and allegations that company gave women lower severance packages than early 
retired men); Darlene Stevens & Barbara Sullivan, An Age Old Problem: Job Gains 
made by Young Don't Translate to Later Years, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1991, at 12 (dis-
cussing disparaging media images of older women in the workplace); Senator Carol 
Mosley-Braun, Women's Retirement Security, 4 ELDER L.J. 493 (1996) (discussing the 
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standing problem: lawyers and courts often fail to adequately 
consider the "hybrid" nature of the discrimination older women 
experience.6 As a consequence, older women who experience 
hybrid discrimination are not fully redressed by the legal sys-
tem. 
The term "hybrid discrimination" is particularly appropriate 
to describe claims of combined age and sex discrimination 
against older women because "hybrid" is defined as "a person or 
group produced by the blending of two diverse cultures or tra-
ditions."'7 Hybrid discrimination against mid-life to older 
women is a hybrid of two long and unfortunate traditions of 
discrimination against women and older persons.8 As with the 
blending of two traditions, hybrid discrimination against older 
women fuses the experience of two different phenomenon into 
one, to produce something new: discrimination against older 
women as "older women." Increased attention to the problem 
of hybrid discrimination against older women is necessary be-
cause the participation of older women in the workforce has 
increased substantially over the last twenty years and is ex-
pected to expand in the next century. 9 This expanding 
standard of living gap between men and women at retirement as a result of their par-
ticipation in the workforce). 
6. Throughout this comment, the author refers to combined claims of age and sex 
discrimination by older women as "hybrid'" discrimination claims. Hybrid discrimina-
tion in this context is discrimination against older women as "older women." 
7. See WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1106 (3d ed. 1993). 
8. See generally, HAROLD L. SHEPPARD & SARA E. RIX, THE GRAYING OF 
WORKING AMERICA: THE COMING CRISIS IN RETIREMENT-AGE POLICY (1977); Diane 
Herz and Phillip L. Rones, Institutional Barriers to Employment of Older Workers, 112 
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 14 (1989); JUDITH C. HUSHBECK, OLD AND OBSOLETE: AGE 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1860-1920 (Garland 1989); JOSEPH E . 
. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw (2d Ed. 1990) discussing the experi-
ences of older employees with age discrimination. For a discussion of the experiences 
of female employees with gender discrimination, see generally, CLAIRE BROWN AND 
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); 
BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KAoUE, SEXUAL HARAssMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 
(1992); GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK (Jerry A. Jacobs, ed., Sage Publications 1995). 
9. Female Participation in the Civilian Workforce, 1980 - 2005 (millions) 
Ages 1980 1990 1995 1996 2000(proj.) 2005(proj.) 
35-44 8.6 '14.7 16.6 17.0 17.8 17.1 
45-54 7.0 9.1 11.8 12.4 14.8 17.1 
55-64 4.7 4.9 5.4 5.5 6.6 8.6 
65+ 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 
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workforce participation by older women may also increase po-
tentiallitigation under both Title VII and the ADEA for hybrid 
discrimination.lO However, unless the current analytical struc-
tures under Title VII and the ADEA evolve to more adequately 
consider the hybrid nature of cases brought by many older 
women, the lack of adequate redress will become worse. 
This Comment examines two ways in which the legal sys-
tem does not adequately consider older women's claims of dis-
crimination. The issues are presented in two conceptual 
groupings. The first grouping discusses how barriers to the 
recognition of hybrid age and sex discrimination claims are 
created when courts do not analyze the evidence of discrimina-
tion together as evidence of discrimination against "older 
women."11 Often, courts analyze hybrid claims of age and sex 
discrimination separately under Title VII and the ADEA, even 
when the evidence of discrimination points to a hybrid claim 
involving discrimination directed at a subset of a protected 
group, such as older women, rather than older employees or 
women generally.12 This separate analytical approach restricts 
Female Participation in the Civilian Workforce, 19BO - 2005 (percent) 
Ages 1980 1990 1995 1996 2000(proj.) 2005(proj.) 
35-44 65.5 76.4 77.2 77.5 7B.7 80.0 
45·54 59.9 71.2 75.4 76.4 7B.2 BO.7 
55·64 41.3 45.2 49.2 49.6 53.4 56.6 
65+ 8.1 8.6 8.8 B.6 9.5 10.2 
Source: U. S. DEPI' OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
2307 tbl. 620, 397 (1997). See last two columns discussing projections of labor force 
participation into the year 2000. 
10. See THIRTY YEARS UNDER THE ADEA, supra note 5 at 610·12 (discussing ex· 
pansion of older women as plaintiffs under the ADEA and possible causes for the in· 
crease). 
11. See case illustration, Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 90·0536, 
1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 (S.D.N.Y~Oct. 11, 1991), see infra notes 220·53 and ac· 
companying text. 
12. See e.g. Murdock v. BF Goodrich, No. 15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 30, 1992) (requiring separate analysis of plaintiffs age and sex discrimination 
claims under Title VII and the ADEA); Scharnhorst v. Independent Sch. Dist. #710, 
686 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1109 (1983) (finding error when 
lower court combined plaintiffs age and sex discrimination claims rather than sepa· 
rately analyze each under Title VII and the ADEA) See also Degraffenreid v. General 
Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E. D. Mo. 1976), atrd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (Bth Cir. 1977) (requiring separate analysis of 
Black woman's race and sex discrimination claims). 
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a court's consideration of how the discrimination intersects and 
can allow employers to defeat older women's claims by showing 
older men and younger women are treated favorably, though 
unfavorable treatment of older women exists.13 
The second grouping discusses how attorneys can fail to rec-
ognize and therefore, effectively present the hybrid nature of 
the bias in an older woman's discrimination claim.14 First, an 
attorney may simply plead discrimination on the basis of age, 
without sex, or vice versa because lawyers may neither con-
sider nor investigate whether combined sex and age bias is in-
volved in the discrimination claims brought by an older 
woman. The decision to plead age bias without sex can weaken 
an older woman's chances of obtaining adequate redress for the 
discrimination because it does not provide a complete picture of 
the discrimination she experiences since it takes an either/or 
approach. 15 Second, lawyers may not examine the benefits of 
pleading hybrid age and sex discrimination as "sex-plus" dis-
crimination under Title VII in demonstrating to a court that an 
older woman's claims of age and sex discrimination involves 
hybrid discrimination against her as an "older woman."16 
In Part II, the Comment presents the theoretical models 
used to establish a discrimination claim under Title VII and 
considers court recognition of multi-factor discrimination 
claims involving sex-plus-race and sex-plus-age under the stat-
13. See Saes, 1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 and supra notes 250-54 and accompa-
nying text. 
14. See case illustration, Crawford v. Medina General Hospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th 
Cir. 1996) infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text. 
15. See Kimherle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersectwn of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscriminatwn Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 189 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (discussing the practical and theoretical 
shortcomings of a "sectional approach" to analyzing combined discrimination claims in 
the context of race and sex discrimination); Elaine W. Shohen, Compound Discrimina-
twn: The Interactwn of Race and Sex in Employment Discriminatwn, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
793 (1980) (discussing the problems of compound discrimination created when race and 
sex discrimination claims are not considered in their totality as discrimination against 
a women as a "woman of color"). 
16. "Sex-plus" discrimination involves employment practices that treat employees 
differently on the basis of their sex plus another characteristic. See infra notes 96-106 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the "sex-plus" model of alleging discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 
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ute. 17 Part II exposes a general presumption in the reasoning 
of the courts analyzing hybrid discrimination against older 
women that separately, either Title VII or the ADEA provide 
adequate protection for their discrimination claims, while the 
case outcomes repeatedly result in adverse judgment against 
plaintiffs on one or both claims.1s Part III introduces the theo-
retical models for alleging discriminatory treatment under the 
ADEA and discusses the uniform disfavorable treatment by 
courts of "age-plus" other factor discrimination claims under 
the ADEA.19 
Next, Part IV examines problems created when courts fail to 
recognize the hybrid nature of many of the age and sex dis-
crimination claims brought by older women because a number 
of courts separate age and sex discrimination into distinct 
categories and consider the evidence of discrimination indi-
vidually.20 Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. is dis-
cussed to illustrate one court's use of an individualized analyti-
17. Specifically, Part II of the comment discusses the theoretical models under Ti-
tle VII for disparate treatment claims, harassment based upon sex, and "sex-plus" 
discrimination. See infra notes 33-106 and accompanying text. It then examines court 
treatment of "sex-plus" discrimination involving race and sex claims by women of color. 
See infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text. The comment also discusses current 
court treatment of age and sex discrimination claims by older women seeking recogni-
tion as a protected subclass under the "sex-plus" model available in Title VII actions. 
See infra notes 119-46 and accompanying text. 
18. See the discussion of Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 and infra notes 125-29 and 
accompanying text; see also the discussion of Tiwmpson v. Mississippi Personnel Bd., 
674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 1987) infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text, wherein 
both courts denied the recognition of discrimination claims by older women as "older 
women" in analyzing those claims. In those cases, the court's concluded that the ADEA 
and Title VII provide separate remedies to older women for their discrimination claiIDs. 
In both instances however, their claims were defeated by evidence of favorable treat-
ment given to other women (under Title VII) and older male employees (under the 
ADEA). See also Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing 
the inappropriateness of the district court's dismissal of an Asian woman's race and sex 
discrimination claims by using evidence of favorable treatment of an Asian male and 
white female), discussed infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. 
19. See discussion of Kelly v. Drexel University, 907 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text. See also the discussion in Luce v. Dalton, 
166 F.R.D. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1996), infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text. Both 
courts held that an "age-plus" theory of discrimination under the ADEA does not exist. 
See also the discussion of Good v. United States West Communications, Inc., No. 93-
302-FR, 1995 WL 67672 (D. Or. Feb.16, 1995) infra notes 205-13 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on the question of whether Good supports the application of "age-
plus" theory to hybrid age and sex discrimination claims under the ADEA. 
20. See, e.g., Melnyk v. Adria Laboratories, 799 F. Supp. 301 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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cal model under Title VII and the ADEA that requires a plain-
tiff to establish and meet separate requirements under each 
statute in order to prove that discrimination occurred on either 
distinct basis.21 Saes demonstrates the ways in which a sepa-
rate analytical model can cause a court to ignore evidence sug-
gesting a hybrid of age and sex in an older woman's discrimina-
tion claims wherein separate analysis of each claim can prove 
ineffective to address hybrid discrimination. 
In Part V, the Comment discusses problems that can occur 
when lawyers fail to consider the hybrid nature of older 
women's discrimination claims and as a result, plead age dis-
crimination, without sex discrimination or vice versa.22 Next, 
Part V critically analyzes the court rationale in Murdock v. 
B.F. Goodrich and Thompson v. Mississippi Personnel Bd. 
wherein each court refused to recognize older women as a dis-
tinct group for protection under Title VII or the ADEA.23 Part 
V also argues for the further extension of the "sex-plus" frame-
work under Title VII to include hybrid claims of age and sex 
discrimination by adopting the reasoning articulated in Arnett 
v. Aspin and argues that "age-plus-sex" claims should be cogni-
zable under the ADEA.24 
In Part VI, the Comment presents the author's recommen-
dations for an alternative framework to the individualized 
analytical model used by courts for analyzing hybrid discrimi-
nation claims: a hybrid approach.25 Part VI explains the bene-
21. See No. 90-0536, 1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991) infra 
notes 220-53 and accompanying text. 
22. In this section, the Comment makes reference to various types of statements 
and conduct that may raise an issue of hybrid age and sex discrimination in an older 
woman's discrimination claims. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text for 
discussion. 
23. See No.15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1992), 674 F. Supp. 
198 (N.D. Miss. 1987). 
24. See 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-40 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (articulating the reasoning for 
extension of "sex-plus" to age and sex discrimination claims). See infra notes 130-46 
and accompanying text for discussion. 
25. A hybrid approach is a method of analyzing cases that involve hybrid or multi-
factor discrimination. Under this approach, courts can consider how the evidence of 
one type of discrimination supports an inference that another type of discrimination 
also played a part in the challenged employer conduct. For a discussion of the hybrid 
approach, with case illustrations, see infra notes 276-319 and accompanying text. 
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fits of a hybrid approach to courts because it allows them to 
consider how the evidence of one type of discrimination sup-
ports an inference of another type of discrimination, in order to 
provide comprehensiveness, rather than a segmented view of 
the discrimination.26 Part VI also articulates a general prag-
matic model for assessing older women's hybrid claims of dis-
crimination so as to assist in providing complete relief to vic-
tims of hybrid discrimination.27 
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (AS AMENDED BY 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991f8 
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964, its 
central focus was to eradicate race discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans and other minority groupS.29 Yet at the time of 
its passage, Congress extended Title VII's coverage beyond race 
to include the historically disadvantaged category of sex under 
its provisions.3o One of the purposes of Title VII is to remove 
26. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Lowe v. City of 
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). 
27. Part VI also establishes a framework for lawyers and judges upon which to as-
sess whether hybrid discrimination is involved in the discrimination claims of an older 
woman. See infra note 320 and accompanying text. 
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
29. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), amended by 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,202-03 (1979) (The primary concern of Congress 
was the economic conditions of Blacks in society). 
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002 (a)-(d) (1994) of Title VII sets out the substantive 
standard of employer liability for employment discrimination. Therein it states in 
relevant part: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment 
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any indi-
vidual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
8
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discriminatory practices and devices that operate in society to 
deny equality of employment opportunity to those protected by 
its provisions.31 To that effect, Title VII makes it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer, employment agency, or 
labor organization to refuse to hire, discharge, or to otherwise 
discriminate, limit, segregate, or classify employees on the ba-
sis of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 32 
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor.organiza-
tion-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or to otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for 
membership or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any 
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against 
any individual in violation of this section. 
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling appren-
ticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training 
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin in, admission to, or employment 
in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training. 
Id. 
Title VII was originally presented as a bill to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion based on race, religion and national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. 
L. No. 88,352, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401. The prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of "sex" was added as a last minute meas-
ure. See Leo Kanowitz, Sex·Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 
305, 310-12 (1968) (noting that sex discrimination was added to Title VII on the 
last day of consideration in order to block passage of the entire act and not to 
protect the employment rights of women). 
31. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977); 
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e..(b}-(d) (1994). Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994), the term 
"employer" under the Act refers to "a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ... " Id. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (c) (1994), the term "employment agency" in Title VII is de-
fined as "any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure 
employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an 
employer and includes an agent of such person. Id. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (d) (1994), the term "labor organization" in Title VII is de-
fined as: 
9
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A. Two THEoRIES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
The United States Supreme Court has articulated two gen-
eral theories of employment discrimination for Title VII claims: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact?3 In a disparate 
treatment case, the plaintiff must allege that her employer 
treated some employees less favorably than others on account 
of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.34 
The plaintiff must also prove that this disparate treatment was 
manifested by either systemic or individual disparate treat-
ment.35 In a disparate impact suit, the plaintiff charges that a 
neutral policy or practice of the employer causes a significantly 
heavier adverse impact upon a segment of the employees cov-
ered by Title VII than other employees.36 
1. The Disparate Treatment Models of Discrimination and the 
Requirement of Intent to Discriminate 
In order to establish a violation of Title VII under the dispa-
rate treatment theory of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove 
that the employer's action was taken with the intent to dis-
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and 
any agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any 
kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, asso-
ciation, or plan so engaged which employees participate and in which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or 
other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general 
committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is 
subordinate to a national or international labor organization. 
ld. 
Exemptions from Title VII's coverage are provided to religious corporations associa-
tions and educational or social institutions that employ persons of a particular religious 
affiliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2001(a) (1994). In addition, taX-exempt private clubs 
are exempt from Title VII coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994). Indian tribes, busi-
nesses on or in the vicinity of Indian reservations where they provide preferences to 
those persons living therein are exempt. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(i) (1994). Aliens em-
ployed outside of the United States are also exempt. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -l(a) (1994). 
33. See Hazen Paper Co v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). 
34. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (1977). Inteut to discriminate does not 
require animus or prejudice; benign motivations may also violate Title VII. See 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976). 
35. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610. 
36. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. 
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criminate.37 Where systemic disparate treatment is involved, 
the employer's conduct demonstrates an intent to discriminate 
. when formal policies are adopted that take into account the 
employee's race, sex, or some other trait protected under Title 
VII.38 Systemic disparate treatment may also exist when the 
employer has no formal policy of discrimination, yet consis-
tently discriminates against members of a protected group un-
der Title VII. 39 
On the other hand, in an allegation of individual disparate 
treatment, the plaintiff challenges the employer's actions as 
discriminatory on the basis of a protected characteristic, such 
as race or sex.40 Though the plaintiffs proof may include evi-
dence alleging that a general atmosphere of discrimination or 
discriminatory acts against other individuals existed, a plain-
tiff in an individual disparate treatment case focuses on the 
discriminatory conduct which is directed at plaintiff.41 Both 
the systemic and individual disparate treatment theories of 
discrimination require proof that the employer intentionally 
discriminated.42 
2. The Disparate Impact Theory: No Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent ill order to Violate Title VII 
Under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, the 
plaintiff is not required to show that the employer possessed 
the intent to discriminate against her in order to prove that a 
violation of Title VII occurred.43 Disparate impact theory chal-
lenges "employment practices that are facially neutral in their 
37. See id. 
38. See Hazen, 510 U.S. at 610. 
39. See id. See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 (even though no formal policy of 
discrimination existed, employer violated Title VII by fIring white employees, but not 
black employee for same offense). 
40. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. 
41. See e.g., Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593 (lst Cir. 1989). The 
additional evidence showing discrimination against other persons and general bias is 
often provided in order to bolster the claim by showing that a general atmosphere of 
discrimination existed and/or that the employer treated individual's similarly situated 
to the plaintiff unfavorably, such as other women, so that the employer more likely 
than not treated plaintiff unfavorably. See id. 
42. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. 
43. See id. 
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treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than another.»44 In a claim for disparate impact, 
a plaintiff must establish that the employer's policies creates a 
class imbalance between the actual workforce composition and 
what it should be if discrimination had not occurred.45 To es-
tablish that a disparate impact exists, plaintiffs generally rely 
heavily upon statistical disparities.46 
B. ESTABLISHING A CASE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER 
TITLE VII47 
In order to establish a case for disparate treatment, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's action was mo-
tivated by discriminatory intent.48 The plaintiff may establish 
intent to discriminate as a result of either direct, inferential, or 
patterns and practice evidence proving intent to discriminate.49 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at 340 n.20; see also Pouncy v. Prudential InS. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 
800 (5th Cir. 1982). 
46. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). 
47. This section discusses only individual disparate treatment claims and models 
of proof used therein because those cases discussed in the sections following, with the 
exception of Thompson u. Mississippi State Personnel Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 
1987), involve discrimination claims alleging individual disparate treatment. Moreo-
ver, the WLDF STUDY found that only five percent of the claims alleging age-and-sex 
discrimination used the disparate impact model to state a claim for discrimination. See 
WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 12. For a more detailed discussion of the disparate im-
pact model of discrimination under Title VII, see Pamela A Perry, Two Faces of Dispa· 
rate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORD. L. REV. 523 (1991); George Rutherglen, Dispa-
rate Impact Under Title VII: An Objectiue Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV 1297 
(1987); 
48. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. The Supreme Court has held that the 
question of whether or not the employer intends to discriminate as a result of its ac-
tions is a question of fact. See United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7ll, 
715 (1983) (when defendant responds to a prima facie case by offering reason for plain-
tift's rejection; fact finder then determines the ultimate factual issue of whether defen-
dant intentionally discriminated); Pullman Standard v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982) 
(whether differential impact on seniority system on Blacks reflect an intent to dis-
criminate is a pure question of fact, not mixed question of law and fact). 
49. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74 (llth Cir. 1982); 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. 
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1. The Role of Direct Evidence in Satisfying the Intent To 
Discriminate Requirement 
Direct evidence of an illegal motive consists of written or 
spoken words demonstrating bias against a protected group, 
such as "women should not work outside of the home," "blacks 
can't do this job," or "I would never hire a foreigner. roO The 
plaintiff's evidence must be able to connect the expressed bias 
to the challenged employer action in order to establish dis-
criminatory intent. 51 Once direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent is presented, a prima facie case of discrimination is es-
tablished.52 The employer is then subject to liability for the 
impermissible discrimination. 53 
50. See Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd as 
modified, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (court held statements by employer 
that ·colored people should stay in their places" and "colored people are hired to clean 
because they clean better" as direct evidence of intent to discriminate where non-Black 
employees were excused from cleaning and cleaning was not in the plaintiffs job de-
scription); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that supervisor's comment that the Hospital needed "new blood" and that he 
intended to recruit younger staff, in conjunction with the conduct that led to plaintiffs 
termination was sufficient to establish direct evidence of discrimination). 
51. See, e.g., Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
52. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
53. Where direct evidence of discrimination is proven, an employer may attempt to 
escape liability by demonstrating that the same employment decision would have been 
made, absent the impermissible consideration. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989). In Price· Waterhouse, a female employee of an accounting firm alleged sex 
discrimination in the decision not to promote her to partner. See id. at 231-32. Hop-
kins presented direct evidence that unlawful considerations entered into the employer's 
decision. See id. The employer rebutted plaintiffs evidence by demonstrating legiti-
mate factors were also considered in reaching its decision. See id. at 251-52. Price-
Waterhouse's holding was modified by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
wherein Congress provided that an unlawful employment practice is established when 
the complaining party demonstrates that discrimination played any part in the adverse 
employment action. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m) (1994). Furthermore, Congress provided that a court finding that impermissible 
discrimination was involved in the employer's decision could award declaratory relief 
and attorney's fees attributable to the pursuit of the discrimination claim. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2005(g)(2)(B)(i) (1994). Congress also provided a defense to a finding of 
complete liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -
5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). Therein it provides that where an employer that can demonstrate 
the same decision would have been made in the absence of the impermissible factor, it 
shall not be subject to an award of damages or a court order requiring "admission, 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment" to the plaintiff once it has met this 
burden. See id. 
13
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Cases presenting direct evidence of discrimination can also 
involve proof of both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the 
employer's actions. These cases, referred to as "mixed motive" 
cases, arise where an employer takes into account more than 
one reason for its decision and the plaintiff proves that at least 
one of the employer's motives is unlawful.54 Once the evidence 
of an illegal motive is connected to the employment action, a 
burden of production shifts to the employer.55 The employer 
must prove that the same decision would have been made, in 
the absence of the impermissible factor in order to escape com-
plete liability for the discrimination.56 
2. The Use of Inferential Evidence to Establish an Employer's 
Discriminatory Intent 
A plaintiff may also establish intent to discriminate absent 
direct evidence, by creating an inference of discriminatory in-
tent through the use of a three-step analytical framework ar-
ticulated in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green.57 The McDon-
nell-Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff in a Title VII 
action must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination.58 The plaintiff must show: (i) 
membership in a protected group, (ii) that she applied and was 
qualified for a job which the employer had available, (iii) that 
she was rejected, and (iv) that following the rejection, the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from individual's with the 
plaintiffs qualifications.59 
The three steps articulated in McDonnell-Douglas to infer 
discriminatory intent begin with the establishment of the 
54. See Price· Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 250 (modified by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071). See also e.g., Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 
597 (3d Cir. 1995). 
55. See Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252. A burden of production requires a 
party to introduce enough evidence to avoid an adverse resolution by the judge. See 
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE 53 (2d ed., Anderson Publishing 
Co. 1995) [hereinafter "WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE"]. See also supra note 53 for an 
explanation of what liability attaches at this point. 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2005(gX2XbXi) & (ii) (1994). 
57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
58. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
59. See id. 
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prima facie case.60 Next, the burden of production shifts to the 
employer.61 The burden requires the employer-defendant to 
articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the em-
ployment decision.62 The employer's reason for the challenged 
action must be one from which a court could infer a lawful mo-
tive for the employment decision.63 If the employer fails to pre-
sent a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, a judgment in fa-
vor of the plaintiff may be entered.64 However, the inference of 
discrimination created by the prima facie case is destroyed once 
the employer carries the burden of producing a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.65 Finally, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff, this time as a burden of persuasion, 
to prove to the trier of fact that the employer's explanation for 
its action is not the true reason, or that it is a pretext for the 
employer's discriminatory motive.66 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
63. See id. at 802-03. An employer can also challenge the facts used by plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case, such as the plaintiff did not meet the minimum qualifica-
tions to be considered for the position. See e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 
F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff need only prove qualifications to the person who 
received the position to meet her prima facie burden in proving employment discrimi-
nation); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) (to establish 
a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, appellants must show, inter alia, that 
they were capable of performing the job). 
64. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.9 (1981). 
The Supreme Court decision in St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) 
modified the framework discussed in Burdine. The Court majority in Hicks held that 
the rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions does not require the trier 
offact to render ajudgment for the plaintiff. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519. 
The Hicks decision endorses the view that even when a plaintiff has met the 
McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting test and the employer has not come forth with a 
credible explanation for the employment action, the fact fmder can choose to ignore the 
evidence and find that some other reason must have motivated the employer's conduct, 
although the employer has not put forth such an argument. For further discussion and 
analysis of the decision in Hicks, see Michael J. Lambert, St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks: The ·Pretext-MaybeD Approach, 29 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 163 (1994); Michael C. 
Phillips, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment Of Title VII 
Precedent, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1054 (1994). For cases applying the Hicks standard, see 
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-126 (7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v. 
NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 842 F. Supp. 243, 247-49 (N. D. Tex. 1994). 
65. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
66. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. A burden 
of persuasion is the burden of persuading the trier of fact of the elements of a claim or 
15
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The plaintiffs burden of persuasion may be met "either di-
rectly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence.1IS7 This burden of persuasion rests at all times with the 
plaintiff.68 If the court concludes that the plaintiffs proof is 
insufficient to prove intent to discriminate, the employer-
defendant is entitled to a judgment.69 If, on the other hand, the 
plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as . 
to the employer's true motivation, the fact finder must deter-
mine whether the pblintiff has carried the burden of persua-
sion by showing that the employer's actions were illegally mo-
tivated.70 If the fact finder agrees, the plaintiff has met this 
burden, then the plaintiff must prevail, unless an employer can 
utilize an affirmative defense to liability. 
Title VII permits the use of a bona fide seniority or merit 
system in establishing differing compensation, terms, privi-
leges and conditions amongst employees, so long as they are 
"not the result of an intent to discriminate.1f71 Employers may 
also utilize the statutory defense of a "bona fide occupational 
qualification" ("BFOQ") in disparate treatment actions for poli-
cies that take religion, sex, or national origin into considera-
tion.72 Employer's claims that a "bona fide occupational quali-
fication" exists will be upheld only "in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, ·or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise.1f73 
defense in accordance with the degree of proof mandated by the substantive law. See 
WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55. 
67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
68. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
69. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807. 
70. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.. 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002(h) (1994). 
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002(eXl) (1994). 
73. See id. See e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & De-
ferred Compensation Plan v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983) (holding "distinc-
tions based on sex are prohibited under Title VII unless they fall within the narrow 
scope of a bona fide occupational exception"); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 
1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a foreign customer's preference for male em-
ployees does not establish a BFOQ). 
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3. Utilizing the Pattern and Practice Model as a Means to 
Establish Employer Intent To Discriminate 
An individual plaintiff may also utilize a pattern and prac-
tice model of proof to establish a violation of Title VII, without 
having to prove by direct evidence that the employer intended 
to discriminate.74 Pattern and practice proof of discrimination 
is usually involved in class action suits wherein multiple plain-
tiffs allege discrimination under a disparate impact theory of 
discrimination.75 However, pattern and practice discrimination 
may also be used when an individual plaintiff alleges discrimi-
nation.76 A plaintiffs evidence must show that the challenged 
conduct was a regular employer practice or pattern and created 
a disproportionate impact.77 A prima facie case may be estab-
lished by the use of statistics alone, or in conjunction with 
other evidence.78 The evidence must be able to demonstrate 
that the employer's practice is a greater barrier to employment 
opportunities for members of the protected group than other 
employees. 
The BFOQ defense applies to disparate treatment claims of intentional discrimina-
tion, but not disparate impact cases where a facially neutral employer practice is in-
volved and a business necessity defense applies. International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 
198-200 (1991) (holding that BFOQ defense, not business necessity, is the appropriate 
standard for disparate treatment cases and because the employer policy was not fa-
cially neutral, it could not constitute a disparate impact, therefore only the BFOQ 
defense was available). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1052 
Stat. 1071 (1991), at § 105 ("A demonstration that an employment practice is required 
by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional dis-
crimination under this title") codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(c)(2) (1994). See 
infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text discussing business necessity. 
74. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-59 n.45. 
75. See e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751 (1976); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). See supra note 42-46 and accompa-
nying text for an explanation and articles discussing the disparate impact model of 
discrimination under Title VII. 
76. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
lower court erred in excluding statistical proof in individual discrimination case); Cox 
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that 
individual claims alleging pattern and practice discrimination follows the Teamsters 
format). 
77. See McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988). 
78. See Dillion v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998,1003-04 (3d Cir. 1984). 
17
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Once the plaintiff establishes pattern and practice discrimi-
nation, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer.79 The 
employer must prove that the plaintiff was not the victim of 
discrimination.so The employer can attempt to rebut the plain-
tiff's showing of disparity by attacking the statistics introduced 
by the plaintiff to establish her case.81 The employer may also 
claim an affirmative defense to a prima facie showing of pat-
tern and practice discrimination by establishing that its prac-
tice is justified as "job related and consistent with business ne-
cessity.~2 A business necessity defense requires an employer 
to prove both a compelling need for the challenged practice and 
that its lacks effective alternatives that would not produce a 
similar disparate impact.83 If the employer fails to produce 
evidence supporting its business justification, the plaintiff 
must prevail.84 
79. See Teamsters, 411 U.S. at 359. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. at 360-61 n.46. 
82. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D. 
Colo. 1996). See also Dowthard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs, 401 
U.S. at 432 (holding that the burden of proving business necessity requires "a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question"). In rebutting plaintiffs statistics, an 
employer may choose to argue that the statistics do not actually demonstrate a statisti-
cally significant adverse impact upon the protected group, or that the statistics are 
over-inclusive. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kip's Big Boy, 424 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Tex. 1977). 
The "business necessity" defense is a judicially created defense made available to 
employers when a facially neutral employment policy has been shown to have a dispro-
portionate impact on members of a protected class. The seminal case addressing 
"business necessity" is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that in order to justifY the business necessity de-
fense, an employer must show that its practice has "a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question." Id. at 432. The Court, in 1989, reduced the standard in 1989 
in Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The new standard 
articulated in Wards Cove required a demonstration by the employer that the practice 
"serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id. at 
659. The Wards Cove holding was expressly overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amendments to Title VII. Congress expressed its intention "to codify business neces-
sity and job relatedness enunciated in Griggs and other Supreme Court decisions prior 
to Wards Cove." See § 3, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Moreover, amendments 
to Title VII, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, specifically codified the circumstances 
which are demonstrative of a disparate impact under Title VII wherein a business 
necessity defense applies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994). 
83. See e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1993) (ap-
plying standard from Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments codifYing business neces-
sity). 
84. See id. 
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C. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS INVOLVING 
HARAsSMENT BASED UPON SEX: Two TYPES OF ACTIONS 
CREATE THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
133 
Older women's hybrid claims of age and sex discrimination 
may involve conduct by the employer that constitutes harass-
ment. Sexual harassment in employment is "the imposition of 
an unwanted condition on the continued employment or on the 
receipt of an employment benefit on account of the person's 
gender.,,85 Those acts constituting sexual harassment may be 
sexual in nature, or they may involve intimidation and hostility 
on the basis of gender, though no explicit sexual conduct is in-
volved.86 Two theories address claims of harassment based 
upon sex: quid pro quo and hostile environment.87 
In a quid pro quo harassment case, the plaintiff alleges that 
the employer explicitly or implicitly connects an employment 
benefit to the grant of sexual favors.88 A prima facie case of 
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment requires that the plaintiff 
show the existence of "unwelcome" sexual conduct and that the 
response to this conduct was predicated upon the possibility 
that some adverse management decision would affect the plain-
tiff's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment.89 A quid pro quo cause of action is available only when 
the harasser is a supervisor with actual or apparent authority 
to cause the plaintiff some economic harm.90 In those in-
85. BARBARA S. GAMBLE, SEX DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK 58 (BNA 1992) !herein-
after "HANDBOOK"J. Although Title VII has included a prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex since its inception in 1964, court interpretation extending Title 
VII's protections to sexual harassment was not accepted until 1976. See id. at 60. See 
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C.C. 1976), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 587 
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
86. See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a plain-
tiff may demonstrate a sexually charged work place in the absence of blatant unwel-
come sexual conduct); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 893 F. Supp. 1263, 1277 
(D.Del. 1994) (holding that nonsexual conduct contributed to the creation of a hostile 
environment for plaintiff, as well as sexually explicit conduct). 
87. See HANDBOOK, supra note 85. 
BB. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994). 
89. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Henson v. City 
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982) (delineating a prima facie case show-
ing of quid pro quo sexual harassment). 
90. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,777-78 (2d Cir. 1994). 
19
Crocette: Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
134 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:115 
stances, an employer is held strictly liable for the conduct of 
supervisory employees.91 
In a harassment case involving a hostile environment, the 
plaintiff alleges that the adverse treatment is gender based, 
irrespective of whether the conduct is sexual in nature.92 
Regular and repeated insults, slurs, epithets, jokes based upon 
gender, increased supervision and criticisms, as well as sexu-
ally explicit conduct may all encompass a hostile working envi-
ronment.93 The plaintiff in a sexual harassment hostile envi-
91. See id. at 780. 
92. See Gallegos, 26 F.3d at 447 (holding that a plaintiff can establish a sexually 
hostile work environment without proving blatant sexual misconduct). Hostile work 
environment was first established as a cause of action in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Rogers involved a claim by a His-
. panic employee that her employer segregated Hispanic patients from other patients, 
thereby creating offensive working conditions. See id. at 237. Rogers held that a viola-
tion of Title VII existed because the employer's conduct created a working environment 
"heavily polluted with discrimination." Id. at 238. The court relied on the language 
"terms, conditions, or privileges" embodied in Title VII's provisions to find a viable 
claim. Id. Since its inception in Rogers, courts have applied hostile environment theory 
to various causes of action, including cases based upon race, religion, sex, and age 
discrimination. 
For cases discussing racial harassment hostile environment, see Vance v. Southern 
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co, 863 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989) (racial hostile 
environment was proven where incidents included the hanging of a noose hanging over 
an employee's work station); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. 
Me. 1991) (racial hostile environment established by supervisor's expressed racial 
hatred ofplaintifl); EEOC Report Dec. No. 72-0779, 4 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 317, 318 
(Dec. 30, 1971) (African-American employee repeatedly referred to as "Nigger"). 
For a case discussing religious hostile environment, see Compston v. Borden, Inc., 
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (supervisor making demeaning religious slurs). See 
also Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title 
VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N. Y. L. Scn. L. REV. 719 (1996). 
For cases discussing age-based hostile environment, see Crawford v. Medina Gen-
eral Hospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs evidence of hostility amounted to 
hostility between coworkers, rather than hostility based upon age); Drez v. E.R. Squibb 
& Sons, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that harassment was 
demonstrated by criticisms, confrontations and personnel file memo referring to plain-
tiff as an "absolute moron"). See also Julie Vigil, Expanding the Hostile Environment 
Theory to Cover Age Discrimination: How Far is Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 565 (1996). 
93. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (explaining that sexual harassment reflecting gen-
der-based animosity is comparable to race or national origin discrimination). 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of agency principles in attaching li-
ability to an employer for sexual harassment hostile environment, but did not ex-
pressly decide when employer liability attaches for supervisory personnel's actions that 
amount to harassment. See id. at 72. Instead, the Court enunciated guidelines 
wherein it concluded that employers are not always liable for their supervisor's con-
duct, but noted that the absence of notice regarding the. supervisor's conduct does not 
necessarily insulate the employers from liability. See id. Courts have found Meritor's 
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ronment claim must demonstrate that harassing conduct was 
unwelcome, and was "sufficiently severe or pervasive so as "to 
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an 
abusive working environment. ~ Factors to be considered in 
determining whether a sexually hostile work environment ex-
ists include the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether 
it involved physical, verbal assaults or humiliation and 
whether the conduct created an unreasonable interference with 
the employee's work performance.95 
D. "SEX-PLUS" DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII: PROVIDING A 
REMEDY FOR DISPARATE TREATMENT OF A SUBCLASS OF 
WORKERS 
The "Sex-plus" theory recognizes disparate treatment by an 
employer of persons based upon a combination of factors. "Sex-
plus" refers to employer conduct whereby the employer treats 
employees differently on the basis of sex plus another charac-
guidance difficult to follow, however, and as a result, adopt differing standards for 
liability. Some courts follow modified, arguably misapplied, respondeat superior prin-
cipals as articulated in Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 to establish when an employer is re-
sponsible for supervisory employee conduct as a "knew or had reason to know" test. 
See e.g., Nichols 42 F.3d at 508 (holding correct standard to apply is the "know or 
should have known" test). Courts have also adopted an agency principle theory to de-
termine when employer liability attaches. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 
F.2d 178, 181-83 (6th Cir. 1992). Still other cases have applied an individual model of 
liability to supervisory personnel by finding that they act entirely outside of the scope 
of employment. See Dockter v. RudolfWolft'Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N. D. 
Ill. 1988) (holding supervisor's behavior committed solely for his own benefit and en-
joyment, not employers). For a discussion on the holding in Meritor and methods of 
determining liability for sexual harassment hostile environments see Robert Lukens, 
Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassment & Individual Liability, 69 TEMP .. L. REV. 303 
(1996); David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of 
Employers For Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. 
REv. 66 (1995); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under 
Agency Principals: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 V AND. L. 
REV. 1229 (1991). 
94. Meritor, 477 U. S. at 67-68. 
95. See Harris v. Forklifl; Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Harris, clarified what level of subjective impact a plaintiff need demonstrate 
in order to establish that an abusive hostile environment exists. Though the Court 
concluded that psychological injury was not required in order to establish a sufficiently 
severe or pervasive hostile environment, it determined that psychological injury could 
be considered as one factor, among others in the plaintiff's case. See id. 
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teristic.96 In a claim for "sex-plus" discrimination, a plaintiff 
alleges that the employer does not discriminate against men or 
women generally, but against a subclass of men or women.97 
The focus in a "sex-plus" claim is on the analysis used to evalu-
ate the discrimination against members of a subset of the pro-
tected group, rather than on a distinct method of pleading. 
Discrimination claims alleging "sex-plus" discrimination may 
encompass the direct, circumstantial, or pattern and practice 
method of proof.98 Such discrimination is covered by Title VII's 
prohibitions because Title VII is not limited to employment dis-
crimination "solely" upon the basis of sex.99 
A large number of "sex-plus" cases involve employer policies 
or practices that disparately treat subclass members of a group 
protected under Title VII.1OO An example may be an employer 
96. Courts have held that distinctions between employees based upon certain 
categories of characteristics establish the resulting "sex-plus" job requirement as sexu-
ally discriminatory in violation of Title VII. Most often these include requirements 
that directly or indirectly involve: 1) immutable physical characteristics, 2) characteris-
tics which while mutable involve fundamental, legally protected rights, such as the 
right to have children or marry, and 3) characteristics which although mutable, signifi-
cantly effect employment opportunities or conditions of employment for members of one 
sex because their use perpetuates the effects of sexual stereotypes. See infra note 100 
for case examples. 
A mutable characteristic is dermed as a thing that is capable of change or being 
changed in form, quality or nature. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL NEW DICTIONARY 1492 
(3d Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Princi-
pals: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229 
(1991) ed. 1993). An immutable characteristic is defined as a thing that is not capable 
or susceptible to change. See id. at 1131. 
97. The term "sex-plus" was introduced by Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit in a 
dissent to the denial of a petition of rehearing en banc in Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated 
and remanded, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curium). 
98. See e.g. Price-Waterhouse, 440 U.S. 228 (1989) (direct evidence); Nashville Gas 
Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (pattern and practice case); Graham v. Bendix Co., 
585 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (circumstantial evidence). 
99. During Title VII's passage, an amendment was proposed that would have lim-
ited the scope of Title VII"s reach in the context of sex discrimination by placing the 
word "solely" before the word "sex" into its provisions. The proposal was specifically 
rejected. See 110 CONGo REC. 2728 (1964). The fIrst court to interpret this legislative 
history as authorizing sex plus other factors is Jeffries V. Harris Community Action 
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir 1980). See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Jeffries. 
100. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock CO. V. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) 
(holding that an employer policy that provided less coverage for pregnancy-related 
conditions to the spouses of male employees than female employees of the company 
constituted sex discrimination against male employees); Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. 136 
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policy that excludes all women of childbearing age from certain 
job classifications.lOl Employment classifications involving 
"plus" factors are considered impermissible "because they pres-
ent obstacles to employment of one sex that cannot be over-
come."I02 
The u.S. Supreme Court recognized that disparate treat-
ment against a subclass of a protected group violates Title VII 
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 103 Phillips involved an 
established employer practice of refusing to hire women with 
pre-school age children but not siniilarly situated men with 
young children.104 Though the majority of applicants hired by 
Martin Marietta were women, the Court recognized that the 
plaintiffs could still establish a violation of Title VIl105 Since 
the U. S. Supreme Court's initial treatment of "sex-plus" in 
Phillips, the doctrine has been extended to cover other classifi-
cations under Title VIllOG 
(holding that an employers policy of denying accumulated seniority benefits to female 
employees returning from maternity leave, although facially neutral, imposed a signifi-
cant burden on female employees that male employees do not experience); Wanbeheim 
v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that employer's benefits 
rule that allowed medical insurance to a spouse only if the employee earned more than 
5% of the families combined income could demonstrate a disparate impact against 
women where 63% of the married females employees could not obtain spousal benefits); 
Jacob v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that company 
policy that fires single women who become pregnant violates Title VII); Sprogis v. 
United Airlines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) 
(holding that employer's policy of terminating married female flight attendants, but not 
males, violates Title VII). 
101. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (holding that excluding women of child-
bearing age from certain job classifications, in order to protect unborn fetuses from 
potential birth defects, discriminates against women on the basis of sex). 
102. See Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th 
Cir.1976). 
103. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
104. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. See also Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (refusal to retain 
married women as flight attendants, but not men). 
105. See Phillips 400 U.S. at 543-44. 
106. See infra notes 106, 110 for additional case cites. 
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1. Treatment of Combined Race and Sex Discrimination 
Claims of "Sex-Plus" Under Title VII: General Acceptance By 
The Legal Community of The Model 
Various courts have recognized that women of color may ex-
perience a unique form of discrimination that is separate and 
apart from the experiences of white females or males of color.107 
For example, Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n 
held that sex and race discrimination against black women 
could establish a violation of Title VII, absent discrimination 
against black males or white females. 108 Jeffries involved a 
suit by Dafro Jeffries against her employer in which she al-
leged race and sex discrimination in promotional opportunities 
for black women in violation of Title VIl109 The employees 
promoted to the positions sought by Jeffries were a black male 
and a white female.no In holding that Jeffries could establish a 
claim of discrimination against black women on the basis of sex 
and race, the court noted that in light of the rationales articu-
lated in the "sex-plus" case law, distinctions in employment 
practices on the basis of an immutable characteristic or a pro-
tected trait violate Title VII.lll 
107. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (lOth Cir. 1987) (black 
women could establish discrimination absent discrimination against black males and 
non-black females); Graham v. Bendrix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) 
(black women are protected against discrimination on the grounds of race and a sex). 
See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 
1467 (l992), Crenshaw, supra note 15; Shoben, supra note 15; Judith Winston, Mirror, 
Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,79 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1991). 
108. See 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980). 
109. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1029. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 1033. The Jeffries court also relied on Phillips, 400 U.S. 542, and 
cited to other courts treatments of subclass discrimination following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Phillips. The court cited In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 
582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that employers' policy requiring female 
flight attendants with children to accept ground duty positions, but not men, is sex 
discrimination); Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984 (female employee's job was abolished as a 
result of rebuffing unwanted sexual advances of employer); Jacobs, 550 F.2d at 371 
(company practice of firing single women who became pregnant violates Title VII); 
Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (no-marriage rule for female stewardesses violates Title VII); 
and Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.O. Pa 1971) (refusal to hire 
married women, but not men violates Title VII). The court also explained that the 
majority of case law rejecting "sex-plus" involved hair-length regulations for men. See 
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Similarly, in Lam v. University of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit 
sustained a race and sex claim by holding that when a plaintiff 
alleges that two bases for the discrimination simultaneously 
exist, they should not be reduced into distinct categories for 
analysis. 112 The plaintiff in Lam was a woman of Vietnamese 
descent, who was considered and ultimately rejected for the 
position as director of the University Law School Pacific Asian 
Legal Studies program.113 
As proof of discrimination Lam offered statements by mem-
bers of the Selection Committee, demonstrating bias against 
Lam and toward women and Asians in general.114 The district 
court granted the University's summary judgment motion on 
Lam's claims of age and sex discrimination because it con-
cluded that the University had given favorable consideration to 
an Asian male and white female for the directorship position.u5 
The Appellate Court for the Ninth Circuit held that Lam's 
allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Title VIl.uS The Appellate Court rea-
soned that because Lam's claims alleged combined race and sex 
bias, a determination as to whether the alleged discrimination 
Phillips, 400 u.s. at 1033. The court cited Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, 
Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) and Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 
527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975). 
In reaching its decision, the Jeffries court examined the legislative history of Title 
VII where the House of Representatives explicitly refused to adopt an amendment to 
the bill that would have added the word "solely" to modify "sex," in the list of prohibi-
tions under Title VII. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032, citing 110 CONGo REc. 2728 
(1964). Jeffries holding recognized that race and sex are both immutable characteris-
tics. But see Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 
(E.D. Mo. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 
1977) (holding that black women do not constitute a protected subclass under Title VII, 
thus separate analysis of their sex and race claims is required). 
112. See 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). 
113. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1554-55 (Lam's parentage was both French and Vietnam-
ese). Lam also alleged national origin discrimination. See id. 
114. See id. at 1560. One professor who chaired the selection committee during the 
first of three searches initiated by the University made disparaging comments about 
Lam's abilities before the selection committee and the campus faculty, while another 
member remarked that the directorship should be given to a male, as a result of stereo-
typed assumptions on the part of the professor that some Asian cultures would not 
accept a female chairperson. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1560. 
115. See id. at 156l. 
116. See id. at 1561-62. 
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against Lam occurred on the basis of the combination of fac-
tors, rather than a separate consideration of whether the em-
ployer discriminated against people of Lam's same sex or race 
was necessary.ll7 Accordingly, the Appellate Court reinstated 
Lam's age and sex discrimination claim.us 
2. Treatment of Combined Age and Sex Discrimination Claims 
as "Sex-Plus" under Title VII 
Although a series of appellate decisions involving race and 
sex discrimination claims by women of color have established 
them as a protected group under Title VII, no federal appellate 
court has extended subclass protection under Title VII to "older 
women."U9 Several lower courts have considered the question 
of whether or not older women can constitute a protected sub-
class of persons over forty who are female. The decisions have 
produced mixed results. 
a. Cases Refusing To Recognize Older Women As a Protected 
Subclass Under Title VII 
In Thompson v. Mississippi State Personnel Bd., a Missis-
sippi district court refused to recognize women over forty as a 
protected class for disparate impact analysis.l20 The plaintiff in 
Thompson alleged both sex and age discrimination and sought 
to introduce evidence comparing herself to men forty and over 
and women under forty in order to prove that the employer's 
requirements for consideration to a management position had a 
disparate impact upon her as an older woman.l2l The district 
court for the Northern District of Mississippi refused to con-
sider this evidence as properly demonstrative of age and sex 
117. See id. at 1562. 
118. See id. at 1566. 
119. But see Scharhorst v. Independent Sch. Diat. #710, 686 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 
1982) (fmding that the trial court committed harmless error when it combined plain-
tiffs age and sex claims). 
120. 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss 1987). For an explanation of disparate impact, 
see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
121. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 202. Specifically, Thompson alleged that the 
educational requirements discriminated against both women and persons over forty 
and that the combination of her sex and age was impacted by the employer's policy. 
See id. at 201. 
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discrimination against Thompson because it concluded that 
"neither Title VII, nor the ADEA recognized older women as a 
protected class for adverse impact analysis. "122 
The district court, in holding that plaintiff's statistical evi-
dence was insufficient to show a disparate impact against older 
employees or women, considered as the proper pool for analysis 
only the statistical evidence comparing all men with all women 
and all employees over forty with one another.123 Moreover, the 
court analytically separated the sex and age evidence, without 
considering what relationship combined age and sex played in 
the alleged disparate impact. Under this analysis, the court 
held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that a disparate 
impact existed on the basis of the employee's ages or sexes.124 
Similarly, in Murdock v. B.F. Goodrich, the Ohio Appellate 
Court rejected the plaintiff's combined age and sex allegations 
of hostile environment discrimination against "older females" 
in promotional and training opportunities in favor of younger 
men.125 The Ohio Appellate Court held that "older females are 
not a separate protected class under state or federal law," and 
therefore, reasoned that an older woman's age and sex claims 
must be analyzed separately from one another because sepa-
rate anti-d.iscrimination statutes were implicated in the 
claims.126 As a result of this reasoning, the defendant obtained 
a summary judgment on both claims.127 The sex discrimination 
claim was rebutted through the employer's showing that other 
women had been promoted.128 Because the court determined 
122. [d. at 203-04. At the time of the action, plaintiff was fifty-nine years old. See 
id. at 201. The requirementa included either a college degree, plus one year of experi-
ence, or two years of college, plus three years of experience. See id. 
123. See Tlwmpson, 674 F. Supp. at 207-8. 
124. See id. at 211. 
125. See No. 15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec 30, 1992) at *3. For a dis-
cussion of hostile work environment, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
126. Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. The court's analysis of Murdock's evidence infers that the female em-
ployees promoted over Murdock were younger women. After rejecting Murdock's claim 
alleging discrimination against ·older females,· the court commented: 
Our review of the recent history of. promotions in Murdock's deparment 
with respect to the two protected classes does not reveal evidence of ei-
ther age or sex discrimination. While Murdock contends that no women 
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that Murdock did not present evidence that all individuals over 
forty were not promoted, the Appellate Court concluded that 
the evidence of age discrimination against older women was 
insufficient to establish a claim of pure age discrimination.l29 
Both Thompson and Murdock represent the current view 
that Title VII provides a separate remedy for discrimination 
against older women, apart from the ADEA. These courts con-
sider Title VII and the ADEA protections to be mutually exclu-
sive. Yet in each case, neither woman prevailed when the court 
considered the evidence of sex and age discrimination individu-
ally, rather than on the basis of the combination of both factors. 
b. Cases Recognizing Older Women As a Subclass Under Title 
VII 
In Arnett v. Aspin, however, the Pennsylvania district court 
for the Eastern District recognized that sex and age discrimi-
nation against older women could constitute protected subclass 
discrimination under Title VII. 130 In Arnett, the federal gov-
ernment employed plaintiff, Mary Arnett, a forty-nine year old 
woman, as a computer specialist.l31 Arnett sought two promo-
tions to the position of equal employment specialist.132 Each 
time, the position went to a woman under the age of forty.l33 
The employer admitted that every other person in the position 
was a woman under forty or a man over the age offorty.l34 Ar-
have ever been promoted above her in her department, according to 
Murdock's exhibit 2 attached to her response to Goodrich's motion for 
summary judgment, Kin Singleton was promoted above her. Also, ac-
cording to her exhibit, another female, Joanne Mahebakken was hired 
into a position above Murdock. As for individuals over forty, Murdock 
has neither presented any evidence that individuals in that class were 
not promoted (emphasis added). 
[d. 
129. See Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3. Because the court did not recognize 
older women as a protected group, it gave no weight to the evidence presented of dis-
crimination against older females as indicative of subset discrimination. See id. 
130. See 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
131. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. The flrSt position went to a woman under 30 years old. See id. The 
second position was given to a 29-year-old woman. See id. 
134. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236-37. 
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nett alleged sex-pIus-age discrimination in promotional oppor-
tunities for older women under Title VII.I35 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the sex-plus-
age claim.l36 They argued that Arnett's claim was not cogniza-
ble under Title VII because age discrimination is afforded pro-
tection under a separate statute and all other "sex plus" classi-
fications involve either an already protected classification un-
der Title VII or an unprotected classification.137 Defendants 
also argued that Arnett's claim of sex-pIus-age discrimination 
should be considered as two separate claims.l38 In considering 
the defendants' motion, Judge Reed noted that the acceptance 
of defendants' construction of Title VII would result in neither 
of plaintiffs claims surviving summary judgment.139 
Judge Reed observed that Arnett's claim of "sex-pIus-age" 
discrimination failed to establish a claim for pure sex discrimi-
nation. 140 Moreover, Judge Reed acknowledged that Arnett's 
age discrimination claim alone was insufficient to state a cause 
of action because pure age discrimination is not cognizable un-
der Title VII, and age discrimination under the ADEA was not 
separately plead.l4l In denying defendant's motion, the court 
recognized that "[i]n a "sex-plus" discrimination case, the Title 
VII plaintiff does not allege that an employer discriminated 
against a protected class as a whole, but rather that the em-
ployer disparately treated a subclass within the protected 
class."142 Judge Reed explained that this approach closes a 
"loophole" in Title VII's protections that allow an employer to 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 1238. 
137. See id. at 1240. The court concluded that without supporting authority man-
dating the limitations argued by defendant, the distinctions in the prior case law were 
insignificant. See id. 
138. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. For a discussion of the ADEA, see infra notes 147-70 and accompany-
ing text. 
142. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238. 
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escape liability for subset discrimination by showing that it 
does not discriminate against all women or older employees.l43 
In support of this approach, the Arnett court cited Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., wherein the Supreme Court first recog-
nized discrimination against a subset rather than all individu-
als within a protected class as actionable discrimination. 144 
The Arnett court concluded that Title VII "sex-plus" case law 
applies where the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant 
discriminated against a subclass of women or men based on 
either (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a 
fundamental right.l45 Moreover, the Arnett court analogized 
"sex-plus" case law involving race-plus-sex to reason that the 
extension of "sex-plus" claims to sex-plus-age is permissible 
wider Title VII.146 
143. See id. at 1240. 
144. See id. at 1238-39. The Arnett court cited to Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. The 
court also considered Willigham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1091-092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that distinctions between men and women in em-
ployment standards based upon something other than immutable characteristics or 
legally protected rights do not violate Title VII); Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1194-98 (holding 
that defendant's policy requiring female flight attendants to be unmarried, but not 
male attendants violated Title VII); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that employer does not have unfettered discretion to re-
quire employees to wear any uniforms the employer chooses where the employer knows 
that such outfits subject female employees to sexual harassment); and Valdes v. Lum-
bermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that where em-
ployers policy against hiring homosexuals was not uniformly applied to male and fe-
male employees, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief under Title VII, where it can be 
established that the asserted reason is merely pretext for sex discrimination). See 
Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-39. 
145. See id. at 1239. 
146. See id. at 1239-40. The Arnett court cited Jeffries, 612 F.2d 1025, 1032 (hold-
ing that discrimination against black women could exist in the absence of discrimina-
tion against black men'or white women), and Graham v. Bendrix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 
1036,1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding that the duty not to discriminate may be violated 
where discrimination is directed at one member of a protected class and not all mem-
bers); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1406 (holding that black women can constitute a protected 
sub-class under Title VII). [d. See also disCUBBion in Good, 1995 WL 67672 infra notes 
205-13 and accompanying text involving an allegation of age and sex discrimination by 
an "older woman." 
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 
The purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("the ADEA") are to promote the employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment, and to help employers and 
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact 
of age on employment.147 The prohibitive language of the 
ADEA was modeled after Title VII.148 Accordingly, courts give 
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994). 
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)-(e) (1994). The substantive provisions of the ADEA are 
identical to those of Title VII, with the exception of the protected classification. See 
supra notes 29,31 for comparison of Title VII's substantive provisions. The prohibitive 
provisions in the ADEA state in relevant part: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age (emphasis added); 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee be-
cause of such individual's age (emphasis added); or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with 
this chapter. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to 
refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any indi-
vidual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for em-
ployment any individual on the basis of such individual's age. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or to otherwise dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail 
or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for em-
ployment, because of such individual's age; 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against 
an individual in violation of this section. 
(d) It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of 
his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency 
to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to 
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, 
because of such individual, member or applicant for membership has 
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such in-
dividual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 
(e) It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or em-
ployment agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or pub-
lished, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an 
31
Crocette: Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
146 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:115 
parallel construction to similar or identical language in both 
statutes. 149 
Under the ADEA, discrimination against individuals who 
are at least forty years of age is prohibited.150 Like Title VII, 
the ADEA reaches workplace discrimination by employers, em-
ployment agencies, and labor organizations in hiring, promo-
tions, work assignments, compensation, environment, and dis-
charge.151 A violation of the ADEA can occur when an employer 
imposes on workers of one age group requirements or condi-
tions not imposed on other age classes.152 
employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employ-
ment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or 
referral for employment by such an employment agency, indicating any 
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on age. 
[d. 
149. See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criwsell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) (adopting 
the narrow construction of BFOQ from Title VII to the ADEA because of identical lan-
guage in the substantive provisions of both statutes). 
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be lim-
ited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age"). [d. 
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).(d) (1994). Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994), the term 
"employer" under the ADEA is dermes as "a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." [d. 
Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1994), the term "employment agency" refers to "any per-
son regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an 
employer and includes an agent of such a person; but shall not include an agency of the 
United States." [d. 
Under 29 U. S. C. § 623(d) (1994), the term "labor organization" means: 
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and 
any such agent of such an organization, and includes any organization 
of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, 
association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with em-
ployers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 
hours or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, 
general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged 
which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization. 
[d. 
Exemptions from the ADEA's coverage are provided for foreign persons not con-
trolled by an American employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2). Elected officials and their 
staff members not covered by the civil service laws of the state are also exempt from 
the ADEA See 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1994). 
152. See Shager v. UpJohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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A. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADEA 
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
discrimination can apply to claims asserted under the ADEA.153 
As in Title VII, a plaintiff may offer direct evidence, in the form 
of verbal or written admissions by the employer to establish 
intent to discriminate under the ADEA.154 Even in a mixed-
motives case, where an ADEA plaintiffs proof demonstrates 
direct evidence of discrimination, she may be awarded declara-
tory relief and attorney fees.155 Unless the employer proves 
that the same decision would have been made despite the ille-
gitimate motive, the plaintiff may also be awarded other forms 
of relief. 156 
153. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (disparate treatment 
case). The proposition that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA is 
not an uncontroversial one. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper Co. 
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), which involved a claim of a discriminatory discharge on 
the basis of age by a sixty-two year old employee. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 607. Although 
Hazen did not involve a claim of disparate impact under the ADEA, the Court, first in 
the majority opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, then in a special concurrence filed 
by Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Thomas, explicitly stated that the Court had 
"never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the 
ADEA" and that it did not address the issue in Hazen. See ide at 610, 614, 618. Some 
courts and commentators have interpreted the peculiarity of the special concurrence to 
represent Court hostility to disparate impact claims under the ADEA. For a discussion 
of the decision in Hazen and a review of those Circuit courts that recognize or deny the 
application of disparate impact to actions brought under the ADEA, see Jan W. Henkel, 
Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins: Arguments in Favor, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183 (1997); Jonas Saunders, The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of 
Liquidated Damages After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 591 
(1996). 
154. See e.g., Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 1981) (state-
ment that plaintiff is "over the bill"); Hodgson v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of 
Broward Fla., 455 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1972) (interview notes stating that the plain-
tiff was "too old"). . 
155. See Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.~d 586, 598, n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (ap-
plying amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, modifying employer burdens in 
mixed-motives cases and liability under Title VII to the ADEA). See supra notes 50-56 
and accompanying text for discussion of how changes to Title VII as a result of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, modify the liability and proof requirements of employers in 
mixed-motive cases under Title VII when impermissible discrimination is demon-
strated by the use of direct evidence. 
156. See id. Comments by employers expressing a general preference for or against 
a particular age class that are descriptive, rather than evaluative in nature (such as 
noting the ages of employees under review) or that are remote in time or connection to 
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As under Title VII, the McDonnell-Douglas-based model and 
its progeny apply in ADEA cases to establish a prima facie 
case.157 In those cases where a plaintiff utilizes the McDonnell-
Douglas framework, she must establish: membership in the 
protected age group, that she was qualified for the position and 
was discharged or otherwise discriminated against despite her 
qualifications, and the position remained open for applications 
from individual's with the plaintiffs same qualifications.158 
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the bur-
den of production shifts to the employer to articulate a "legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason" for the employment 
decision.159 The burden is only a burden of producing a reason, 
from which the court may infer that the employer did not dis-
criminate.l60 If the defendant fails, a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff may be entered.l61 However, the presumption of intent 
to discriminate is destroyed once the employer comes forth with 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.162 The 
ultimate burden shifts back to the plaintiff, as a burden of per-
suasion. l63 The plaintiff must prove to the trier of fact that the 
employer's explanation is a pretext for its discriminatory mo-
tive.l64 As with Title VII, the burden of persuasion of the em-
ployer's motive rests at all times with the plaintiff under the 
ADEA and if the plaintiff fails to convince the trier of fact, a 
judgment for defendant is entered.l65 
the challenged employment action, have been held not to conclusively establish direct 
evidence of age bias by the employer. See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 402. 
157. See McDonnell.Douglas, 411 U.S. 792. See, e.g., Hazen, 507 U.S. at 612; Miller 
47 F.3d at 598 n. 10. Even though the McDonnell-Douglas test is a standard frame-
work for proving discrimination, some courts have held that age discrimination suits 
should be decided on a case by case basis without rigid adherence to McDonnell-
Douglas. See e.g., McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir. 1990). 
158. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under the ADEA, the plaintiff must be 
at least forty years of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). 
159. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
160. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
164. See id. 
165. See supra note 68 and accompanying text .. 
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Several statutory defenses are available to counter a charge 
of age discrimination. They include the use of a bona fide occu-
pational qualification ("BFOQ") defense under which an em-
ployer may lawfully take age into account.166 To establish a 
BFOQ, an employer must prove that it is "reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of the particular business. "167 Employ-
ers may also defend against a claim of age discrimination by 
demonstrating that a bona fide employment benefits plan, or 
seniority system is in place.168 Additionally, employers may 
affirmatively defend against a claim of age discrimination by 
showing that the action taken is "based upon reasonable fac-
tors other than age. "169 A "reasonable factor" is one that must 
not present any considerations of age.170 
B. MULTI-FACTOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA: 
"AGE-PLUS" OTHER FACTOR CLAIMS GENERALLY HELD NOT 
VALID UNDER THE ADEA 
Several courts have explicitly addressed the issue of 
whether age, in addition to another characteristic, or "age-plus" 
discrimination exists under the ADEA. Those courts flatly re-
ject the proposition that an "age-plus" cause of action is valid 
under the ADEA. 
In Kelly v. Drexel University, for example, a former em-
ployee of Drexel University ("University") alleged discrimina-
tion on the basis of his combined age and disability in the Uni-
versity's decision to terminate him during a reduction in 
workforce. l7l At the time of the discharge, plaintiff, Francis 
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(1) (1994). 
167. ld. 
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(2) (1994). 
169. 29 U.S.C. § 623 ( 0(1) (1994). 
170. See id. "Reasonable factors other than age" include uniformly required cre-
dentials such as education, prior experience, and employment policies that measure 
merit or the quality or quantity of performance. Those not meeting the standards may 
be discharged "for good cause" regardless of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1994). 
171. 907 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The decision in Kelly was rendered by the 
same district court judge that issued the opinion in Arnett v. ARpin., 846 F. Supp. 1234 
(E. D. Pa. 1994). Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869. Plaintiff brought actions under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 - 12213, and its state counterpart, Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act, 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963. Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869. The 
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Kelly, was sixty-eight years old.172 Kelly worked in the Univer-
sity's purchasing department as Senior Buyer for twelve 
years.173 Kelly's employment began in 1981 when he was fifty-
six years old. 174 
As proof of age discrimination, Kelly relied on a conversa-
tion with his supervisor in which he was asked when he in-
tended to retire.175 Kelly also presented a letter he received 
from the University shortly after his termination, referring to 
Kelly as a "retiree."176 
The district court considered the supervisor's question re-
garding Kelly's intent to retire.177 The Court noted that the 
question arose within the context of a conversation regarding 
Kelly's son and his recent graduation from college and how that 
would affect Kelly's decision to retire.178 Under those circum-
stances, the Kelly court concluded that the statement did not 
demonstrate any age-related animus.179 With respect to the 
letter, the University's policy defined a former employee over 
fifty-five with ten or more years of service as a ~etiree entitled 
to retirement benefits.1so The court found that the University's 
policy did not provide a sufficient inference of discrimination 
against Kelly since his employment at the University did not 
commence until he was fifty_six.1s1 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [hereinafter "ADA"], at section 12112(a) pro-
vides that: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with 
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharges of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment. 
[d. 
172. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869. 
173. See id. at 869. The ages of the two other buyer employees in the department 
who retained their positions were flfty-four and forty-six. Plaintiffs supervisor was 
aged flfty. [d. at 869-870. 
174. Seeid. at 869. 
175. See id. at 872. 
176. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 872. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 872. 
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Kelly's proof of disability discrimination consisted of cir-
cumstantial evidence that included expert testimony regarding 
the role of stereotypes about disabled persons in employment 
decisions.182 Kelly argued that the court could infer intent to 
discriminate as a result of possible stereotypical assumptions 
as to Kelly's ability to effectively perform his position because 
the employer was aware that Kelly walked with a limp.l83 
The district court granted the University's motion for sum-
mary judgment on both the age and disability claims.l84 The 
district court concluded that there was no evidence of age bias 
and that Kelly's injury did not meet the definition of a disabil-
ity under the ADA.I85 In a footnote to the opinion, the Court 
addressed Kelly's contention that his "age-plus-disability" cre-
ated a protected subclass of older workers with disabilities for 
analysis of his claims.l86 Although the district court agreed 
that subclass discrimination against a subclass of protected 
workers is cognizable under Title VII, it concluded that the 
doctrine applies only when the allegation involves sex plus 
some other form of discrimination.187 The court resolved its 
prior decision in Arnett v. Aspin with its reasoning in Kelly 
when Judge Reed clarified that the decision in Arnett recog-
nized a claim of combined age and sex discrimination as "sex-
plus" discrimination under Title VII, not "age-plus" discrimina-
tion under the ADEA. 188 In Kelly, Judge Reed stated that he 
182. See id. at 871. 
183. See id. Plaintiffs limp was caused by a hip injury in 1987. The condition was 
diagnosed as severe post-traumatic degenerative joint disease of his right hip. See id. 
at 870. Plaintiffs argument suggested that given the widespread stereotyped percep-
tions of disabled persons in society, knowledge of a physical impairment alone, was 
sufficient to raise an inference that impermissible discrimination based upon stereo-
typed assumptions about persons with disabilities existed in Kelly's claim. See id. at 
871-72. 
184. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 878. Summary judgment is a judgment granted on a 
claim about which there is no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the party 
seeking summary judgment is entitled to prevail as a' matter of law. This allows a 
speedy disposition of a controversy without the need for trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
185. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 873-74. The court determined that plaintiffs hip 
and subsequent difficulty walking did not constitute a "substantial limitation" on his 
ability to walk within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and its regulations, at 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 874. 
186. See id. at 875 fn.8. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
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found no authority for an "age-plus" discrimination claim under 
the ADEA, while ample precedent for "sex-plus" claims 
existed.1s9 Accordingly, Judge Reed held that Kelly's claim for 
discrimination as a result of membership in a subclass of older 
workers was not cognizable under the ADEAl90 
Similarly, in Luce v. Dalton, the District Court for the 
Southern District of California addressed the viability of "age-
plus" claims, alleging age-pIus-disability and age-pIus-religion 
discrimination.191 Luce's termination from his position with the 
Navy's Meteorology Engineering Centers occurred in 1982.192 
At the time Luce commenced his action in 1993, the separate 
claims of disability and religious discrimination were time 
barred. 193 Luce moved for leave to amend his complaint alleg-
ing age discrimination to include allegations of "age-plus-
religion" and "age-pIus-disability" discrimination.l94 The Ap-
pellate Court, after considering Luce's arguments on the exis~ 
tence of a viable "age-plus" theory, held that both claims were 
unsupported by Luce's argument.195 
189. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 875 fn.8. 
190. See id. 
191. See 166 F.R.D. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1996). 
192. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 462. 
193. See id. Plaintiff had improperly filed an appeal of his termination to the U.S. 
Merit System Protection Board, claiming age discrimination without first exhausting 
all administrative remedies within the U.S. Navy. The complaint was subsequently 
dismissed for lack ofjurisdidion. In 1987, plaintiff retained counsel and filed an action 
for age discrimination in the present court which was again dismissed and remanded to 
the U.S. Navy EEO officer in 1990 for investigation and determination. In 1993, the 
Navy's EEO officer dismissed plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction and shortly 
thereafter, plaintiff instituted this proceeding, pro se, alleging violations of the ADEA, 
and religious discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court dismissed plaintiffs 
religious discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as pre-empted by provisions of 
Title VII, without leave to amend because the claim was then time barred. See Luce, 
166 F.R.D. at 462. Moreover, plaintiff conceded that his disability discrimination 
claim, standing alone, would not satisfy the definition of disability within the meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459. 
194. See id. at 458. Because the age discrimination claim was not time barred, 
plaintiff may have believed his allegation of "age-plus" disability and religion were 
theoretically cognizable as arising out of the age discrimination under the ADEA See 
id. 
195. See id. at 461. Plaintiff cited only one secondary source, ERNEST C. HADLEY, A 
GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE 750 (1995 Ed.), for 
the proposition that being over forty and a member of a Title VII class may state a 
cause of action for discrimination in support of his Mage_plus" claim. See id. 
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In determining that an "age-plus" claim was not possible 
under the ADEA, the district court considered the sex-plus the-
ory available under Title VII, as articulated in Phillips, Jef-
fries, Hicks, and Lam. 196 According to the Luce court, the ex-
plicit language relied upon by courts interpreting Title VII's 
bar against race, sex, national origin, or religion as inclusive to 
all forms of discrimination under its provisions could not be 
extended to support an "age-plus" theory of discrimination.197 
The court reasoned that unlike Title VII, no argument exists 
that Congress intended to include any group for protection, 
other than age in any of the provisions of the ADEA.198 The 
Luce court explained that courts supporting an expansive view 
of Title VII's protections have relied upon the language of Title 
VII protecting multiple groups, such as race, religion, sex, and 
national origin simultaneously to argue that multi-factor dis-
crimination is both prohibited and cognizable under Title 
VII.199 In contrast, the ADEA provides but one classification 
for protections under its provisions.200 The Luce court held that 
196. Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-60. See Phillips, 400 U.S. 542, supra notes 103-06 and 
accompanying text; Jeffries, 615 F.2d 1025, supra notes 107-11 and accompanying 
text; Hicks, 833 F.2d 1406, infra notes 309-19 and accompanying text; Lam, 40 F.3d 
1551, supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. 
197. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461. 
198. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-61. The Luce court considered the reasoning in 
Jeffries wherein the Jeffries court noted that Congress placed the word "or!' in between 
the prohibitive provisions ofrace, color, religion, sex and national origin in Title VII as 
evidence of its intent to cover each classification inclusively. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 
459-60, citing Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032. The Luce court also cited to Hicks, 833 F.2d at 
1416, applying Jeffries reasoning to hold that a black female plaintiff could aggregate 
the evidence ofrace and sex discrimination in her claim. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 460-
61. 
199. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-61, discussing the opinion in Jeffries, Hicks, Lam. 
See supra note 196 for case cites. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994), the relevant 
language in Title VII reads, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any em-
ployer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions and privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin . .. (emphasis added)." [d. 
200. The text of the ADEA reads in relevant part, "It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for any employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of such individual's age (em-
phasis added)." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994). See also supra notes 148-51 for other 
substantive provisions under the ADEA 
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recognition of "age-plus-religion" or "age-plus-disability" as an 
extension of "sex-plus" would amount tojudiciallegislation.201 
Moreover, in reaching its decision, the court considered the 
opinions in Arnett and Kelly involving combination of age with 
other factors in a "plus" theory.202 The Luce court noted that 
Arnett explicitly recognized that "sex-plus-age" discrimination 
is available under Title VII and not the ADEA.203 Furthermore, 
the Luce court considered that the court in Kelly determined 
that no authority to recognize "age-plus-disability" discrimina-
tion exists under the ADEA. 204 
Both Luce and Kelly explicitly reject the notions that an 
"age-plus" model of discrimination is available under the provi-
sions of the ADEA. Therefore, plaintiffs with hybrid or multi-
factor discrimination claims encompassing age, obtain incom-
plete relief under the ADEA alone. Some commentators have 
read the decision of an Oregon district court judge in Good v. 
United States West Communications Inc. to authorize an "age-
plus" model to allege discrimination on the basis of age and sex 
under the ADEA.205 The next section analyzes the likelihood 
that Good's holding recognizes as cognizable an "age-plus" 
claim under the ADEA. 
1. Good v. United States West Communications, Inc.: The 
Implications For An "Age-plus" Claim 
In Good v. United States West Communications, Inc., an 
Oregon district court reinstated the age discrimination claim 
under the ADEA of a forty-five year old former employee of 
West Communications.206 The plaintiff, Good, alleged a dis-
201. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461. 
202. See id. at 460. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240; Kelly, 907 F. Supp. 864, 
875 n.8. 
203. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 460, citing Arnett, 864 F. Supp. at 1240. 
204. Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 460. See discussion of Kelly, supra notes 171-90 and ac-
companying text. 
205. See Mary E. Powell, Comment, The Claims Of Women of Color Under Title VII: 
The Interaction of Race and Genckr, 26 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV., 413, 434-36 (1996). 
See also, WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that theoretically Good's claim 
could be brought as Mage-plus" under the ADEA). 
206. See No. 93-302-FR, 1995 WL 67672 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 1995). 
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criminatory termination on the basis of her age and sex.207 In 
the proceeding below, the Magistrate Judge granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgement on Good's age, but not 
sex claim holding that the age difference of two and one-half 
years between Good and her replacement was legally insuffi-
cient to establish that she was replaced by a substantially 
younger individua1.208 
Good moved for reconsideration and reinstatement of her 
age claim by arguing that her replacement by a "younger man" 
was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether she was 
discriminated against on the basis of her combined age as well 
as sex status.209 On reconsideration, the district held that 
Good's age claim should be reinstated where Good could dem-
onstrate that the combination of her age and sex resulted in 
her termination.210 
In its one page opinion, the Good court reached its decision 
to reinstate Good's age discrimination claim by relying on the 
recent decision in Lam v. University of Hawaii as authority.211 
Lam was analyzed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit as a combined race and sex allegation under Title VII.212 It 
is arguable that Good is the first case to recognize that an "age-
plus" theory of liability is cognizable under the ADEA. How-
ever, because the Good court's opinion relied on the "sex-plus" 
theory applied in Lam to hold that Good should be allowed to 
demonstrate that the combination of her age and sex played a 
role in her treatment, the opinion in Good supports the conclu-
sion that the court used a "sex-plus," rather than establishing 
an "age-plus" rational to resolve Good's claim.213 
207. See Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1. 
208. See id. Good's replacement was a forty-two year old male. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1551. For a discussion of 
Lam, supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. 
212. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1561-52. 
213. It might be more accurately stated that the decision in Good, rather than Ar· 
nett was then first to recognize that "sex-plus-age" discrimination is cognizable as "sex-
plus" discrimination under Title VII since Good was decided before Arnett. 
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The effect of Good on establishing a valid "age-plus" doc-
trine .is currently speculative since the court did not explicitly 
address the issue. However, the reasoning applied to both Lam 
and Good's claims: that where multi-factor discrimination is 
alleged, a plaintiff should be allowed to demonstrate that the 
combination of factors resulted in discriminatory treatment 
which should be adopted to resolve "age-plus-sex" discrimina-
tion claims under the ADEA, as well as Title VII. However, 
courts like Kelly and Luce that have explicitly addressed the 
viability of "age-plus" factors other than sex under the ADEA 
have responded negatively to the claims. 
IV. TREATMENT OF HYBRID DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
BY COURTS: THE SEPARATE ANALYTICAL MODEL AND 
ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HYBRID AGE AND SEX 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Compounding the problems created by hybrid discrimina-
tion when courts do not accept older women as a protected sub-
class under Title VII, thereby causing courts to refuse to con-
. sider any multi-factor discrimination claims under the ADEA, 
is court treatment of hybrid age and sex discrimination once an 
allegation of discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII is 
advanced. Courts use a separate analytical model ("separate 
basis approach") to analyze age and sex claims as separate and 
distinct causes of action, even if the pleading suggests hybrid 
discrimination.214 
Pleading hybrid sex and age discrimination claims can take 
one of several forms. First, a plaintiff may make explicit refer-
ences to discrimination as specifically directed at "older women 
or females," with supporting proof.215 This model may be 
adopted where disparate treatment or impact against older 
214. See Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. R. Co., 803 F.2d 1322 
(4th Cir. 1986); WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 19-21. See, e.g., Murdock, 1992 WL 
39318; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. 198,203-04; Sharnhorst, 686 F. 2d 637. 
215. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 12-13. See e.g., Dugan v. Pennsylvania 
Miller Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 785 (M.D. Pa. 1994), affd 68 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Blonder v. Evanston Hosp. Corp., No. 91-C-3846, 1992 WL 44404 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Ri-
elly v. Prudential Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 725 (D.N.J. 1987). 
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women is present, but general age or sex bias is not. A second 
pleading form for hybrid discrimination claims may adopt the 
"sex-plus" model, by arguing that older women are a protected 
subclass under Title VII, in conjunction with the proof of dis-
crimination directed at older women as "older women.71216 
Third, a hybrid discrimination claim may allege discrimination 
as a result of age, under the ADEA and sex under Title VII, 
and present evidence of disparate treatment against plaintiff 
on the basis of both, in conjunction with evidence of a general 
atmosphere of sex and age bias.217 
A separate basis approach to analyzing the evidence of age 
and sex discrimination requires a plaintiff to prove that dis-
crimination occurred on the basis of age or sex, independent of 
one another.218 Under a separate basis approach, a court allo-
cates the evidence applicable to the age and sex claims into in-
dividual categories.219 This approach does not provide ade-
quate protections for litigants with hybrid discrimination 
claims because the approach fails to recognize the inter-
relatedness of the evidence of age and sex bias, or how each 
piece of evidence of age discrimination may support the sex dis-
crimination claim under the circumstances presented in the 
claim. Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. illustrates this 
potential.220 In Saes, Alice Saes sued her former employer, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. ("Manufacturers Hanover"), 
for age and sex discrimination in its termination decisions 
during a reduction in the workforce.221 Manufacturers Hanover 
terminated Saes, four other women, and two men from their 
216. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 16-18. See e.g., Arnett, 846 F. Supp. 1234; 
Soggs, 603 N.Y.S.2d 21; Palmero, 809 F. Supp. 341; Comway, 825 F.2d 593. 
217. See, WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 30-31. See e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced 
Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991); Rollins v. TechSouth Inc., 833 . 
F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1987). 
218. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 19. Courts can also analyze combined sex 
and age discrimination claims under a protected subclass model and a hybrid, or multi-
discrimination approach. For a discussion of the protected subclass approach, see id. at 
16-19, and notes 119-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the hybrid ap-
proach used by courts, see id., at 21-22, and infra notes 276-319 and accompanying 
text. 
219. See id. at 19. 
220. No. 90-0536, 1991 U S Diat. Lexis 14634 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 11,1991). 
221. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at * 1 -2. 
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positions as underwriters, but retained three substantially 
younger males in the remaining positions.222 
At the time of her termination, Saes was fifty-five years old 
and had been employed in various capacities with Manufactur-
ers Hanover for thirty-nine years.223 Of the six other employees 
dismissed, four were over the age of forty.224 The district court 
for the Southern District of New York granted Manufacturers 
Hanover's motion for summary judgment on the sex claim, but 
not the age discrimination claim.225 The district court consid-
ered each cause of action individually and allocated the evi-
dence separately to analyze the strength of each of Saes' 
claims.226 
For the sex discrimination claim, the court considered a 
memo prepared by' the head of Saes' former department that 
noted the sex of each employee to be terminated.227 Saes also 
alleged "various acts of discrimination" in which female em-
ployees were not invited to intra-departmental meetings of 
bank officers.228 Saes also demonstrated that the five female 
underwriters that were terminated represented the entire 
number of women employed in the department.229 Relying on 
this evidence, the court held Saes' allegations were insufficient 
to establish a claim of sex discrimination.230 The court then 
dismissed Saes' sex discrimination claim.231 
222. See id. at * 2. 
223. See id. at *1-2. Saes began her employment in 1949. From 1985, until the 
time of her separation from the company, Saes worked as an underwriter in the banks 
Hicksville, New York facility. The court did not specify what other positions Saes held 
within the bank prior to 1985. See id. at *1. 
224. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2. 
225. See id. at *5-6. 
226. See id. at *6-11. 
227. See id. at *6-7. The notations were "b" for "boy" and .g" for "girl" pencilled in 
besides the last names of the underwriters. Manufacturers Hanover claimed that the 
notations were added after it made the termination decisions, in order to comply with 
federal regulations requiring the personnel department to provide an analysis for dis-
crimination purposes. See id. at *7. 
228. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *7. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. at *7-8. 
231. See id. at *17. 
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In analyzing Saes' evidence of sex bias, the court noted that 
Saes did not provide evidence on the sex composition of the 
other two thousand bank employees that were terminated from 
other departments during the reduction in workforce.232 
Moreover, in rebutting Saes' prima facie showing of sex dis-
crimination, the district court relied on evidence that within a 
month of Saes' termination, the bank rehired a younger female 
underwriter.233 The court also considered that, a year later, 
Manufacturers Hanover hired another younger woman as an 
underwriter.234 The court concluded that Manufacturers 
Hanover did not discriminate on the basis of sex because it 
hired these other women.235 The Saes court did not specify the 
ages of the other terminated female underwriters in its opin-
ion, but simply stated that of the six terminated employees 
"four were over forty. JJ236 The significance of the information to 
Saes in creating an inference of bias against her as an older 
woman, rather than bias against women in general was signifi-
cant, particularly because the underwriters retained by Manu-
facturers Hanover following the reduction were all men, age 
thirty-nine, forty-two, and forty-eight.237 Yet, the court failed to 
consider how the sexes of the other terminated underwriters 
over forty, impacted Saes' sex discrimination claim, particu-
larly if all four of the other females underwriters were forty or 
older.238 
Next, the district court separately analyzed Saes' age 
claim.239 The court considered the termination of a dispropor-
tionate number of employees over the age of forty in the un-
derwriter's groUp.240 Moreover, the court noted, but did not 
232. See id. at *8. 
233. Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *8. The woman rehired was forty at the 
time of her dismissal and subsequent rehire. See id. at n.3. 
234. [d. at *8. The new hire was twenty-eight years old at the commencement of 
her emploYment. See id. 
235. See id. at *8-9. 
236. See id. at *2. 
237. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2. 
238. The evidence in the opinion showed that Saes and at least one of the other 
women terminated during the employee reductions was at least forty at the time they 
were dismissed. See id. at *8 n. 3. See supra note 233. 
239. See id. at *10-11. 
240. See id. at *10. 
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factor into its determination the memorandum prepared for the 
personnel department listing the age of each employee consid-
ered for discharge or retention.241 The district court also relied 
on the alleged statement by the personnel manager that the 
reason for Saes' termination was her age.242 Additionally, the 
court cited the ages of new hires it had previously used to rebut 
Saes' sex discrimination claim in analyzing the age claim.243 
The court also considered that Saes' had thirty-nine years of 
experience with Manufacturers Hanover and that her qualifi-
cations and expertise surpassed all of the male retained un-
derwriters who were substantially younger than Saes.244 The 
court concluded that this evidence raised an inference of age 
discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.245 
Thus, the court sustained Saes' age discrimination claim.246 
With the exception of the contested statement by the per-
sonnel manager that Saes' termination occurred because of her 
age, the evidence for both Saes' age and sex claims was nearly 
identical.247 Saes was much older than both the male retained 
underwriter employees and every female and male hire.24s The 
contested statement that Saes' firing occurred because of her 
age could easily be interpreted as a statement that Saes, as an 
"older woman," rather than simply an older employee was ter-
minated because of her age, given the supporting inferences of 
other proof. For example, Saes demonstrated that within a 
month of her termination, Manufacturers Hanover rehired one 
of the terminated female underwriters who was forty at the 
time of her dismissal and rehire.249 All of the retained male 
241. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *10. The court gave no weight to 
this evidence because of defendant's proffered reason for maintaining such records that 
it discussed in ruling on the sex claim. See id. at *11 n. 5. See also supra note 227 for: 
the employer's explanation. 
242. See id. at *10. 
243. See id. at *10. In addition to the allegations involving the two younger 
women, the court also considered a third allegation, involving a younger male of thirty-
two at the time of his hire. See id. 
244. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *14. 
245. See id. at *16. 
246. See id. at *18. 
247. See id. at *6-11. 
248. See id. at *2, 8. 
249. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2, 9-10 n .. a. 
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underwriters were significantly younger than Saes.250 Moreo-
ver, all of the subsequent hires of both genders were substan-
tially younger and had much less experience than Saes.251 
The court did not consider how the combination of the ages 
and sexes of the terminated employees as compared to the re-
tained and new hire employees might support Saes' combined 
age and sex discrimination claim. Though the court was will-
ing to narrow the question of age bias to the underwriter posi-
tions, it refused to do so for the sex claim.252 Further, while the 
court considered Saes' thirty-nine years of experience with 
Manufacturer's Hanover and superior credentials as compared 
to the younger retained and newly hired employees, it did not 
use the same analysis in considering the sexes, in conjunction 
with the ages of those employees.253 
An argument can be made that Saes' evidence raised an in-
ference of hybrid sex and age discrimination against her as an 
older woman in the reduction decisions sufficient to survive 
summary adjudication. However, unless courts have a flexible 
approach to use in analyzing the evidence of hybrid sex and age 
discrimination, overlaps in the evidence can be overlooked. 
Applying a separate basis approach to consider the evidence 
of discrimination, no matter how much it suggests hybrid dis-
crimination, necessarily limits a court's attention to an analy-
sis based solely upon the categories to which the evidence is 
placed and supports a rigid analytical structure that is inap-
propriate for hybrid claims. Moreover, an older woman's ef-
forts to obtain complete redress for hybrid discrimination is 
harmed when a separate analytical model is used because this 
250. See id. at *2. 
251. See id. at *10, 14. Though the court did not compare Saes' experience and cre-
dentials to that of the other female rehire and new hire. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that neither the forty, nor the twenty-nine year old had comparable experience 
or expertise as Saes since Saes had thirty-nine years of experience. See id. 
252. See id. at *8. See supra note 231 and accompanying text wherein the court re-
quired proof of the sex composition of the two thousand other bank employees termi-
nated in the workforce reduction. See id. 
253. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at notes 239-46 and accompanying text 
for recap of analysis the court used in separately analyzing Saes sex and age discrimi-
nation claims. 
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approach repeatedly ignores the inter-relatedness of the claims 
and can allow a defendant to obtain a summary judgment sim-
ply by showing how younger women and older men are not 
subject to the adverse treatment.2M 
White men alleging discrimination on the basis of their 
status as "white males" illustrate the incompatibility of a sepa-
rate analytical model for hybrid discrimination claims.255 
Those claims have not been subjected to the bifurcated analyti-
cal framework that other "sex-plus" claims experience, nor 
have they been resolved on summary judgment for lack of evi-
dence of sex discrimination against men of color, or race dis-
crimination against white women.256 As ineffective as evidence 
of discrimination directed at men of color and white females 
would be to providing redress for claims of discrimination by 
white males as "white males," so too is the evidence of dis-
crimination against older male employees or younger women to 
resolve the claims of discrimination by older women. Because 
neither category of evidence involving persons outside of the 
plaintiff's class (i.e. race, sex, or age) directly addresses dis-
crimination against plaintiff, it should not be summoned in 
order to defeat a showing of discriminatory treatment directed 
at the plaintiff as an older woman. A separate analytical model 
applied to hybrid discrimination suits is not only inappropriate 
to resolve those claims, but may also create a negative impact 
by allowing evidence of treatment of persons who are not simi-
larly situated to the older woman to defeat her hybrid claims. 
Courts may be unaware of how to weigh the evidence of age 
and sex discrimination against older women as "older 
women. m!57 Or, as in Saes, use· of a separate basis approach 
may prevent a court from considering how each piece of evi-
dence of age discrimination supports the sex discrimination 
claim and vice versa. In either case, the failure to apply an 
analytical model that examines the inter-relatedness of age 
and sex discrimination has resulted in court treatment that 
254. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 20. 
255. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562, fn. 19 for similar observations made by the court. 
256. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th eir. 1991). 
257. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 34. 
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does not adequately resolve the particular experience with hy-
brid discrimination that older women face. 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. How LAWYERS CAN INEFFECTUALLY TREAT HYBRID OR DUAL 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
The ability of older women to obtain adequate redress for 
claims of discrimination is also significantly hampered by the 
failure of their attorneys to investigate the potential of combi-
nation discrimination.25s An attorney may assume that the 
treatment an older female employee receives is largely the re-
sult of her age or sex, rather than her combined status as an 
"older woman. "'259 As a consequence, lawyers may wholly ig-
nore the potentially stronger claims of hybrid age and sex dis-
crimination or discrimination against older women that are 
available on the facts underlying the plaintiffs claim, than a 
pure age or sex discrimination claim alone.260 
For instance, in one case, a sixty year woman alleged dis-
criminatory treatment by her employer consisting of state-
ments made by her supervisor that "women over 55 should not 
be working", in conjunction with conduct alleged to be directed 
only at "older ladies," as well as evidence of general age bias?61 
The claim, however, was brought as pure age discrimination 
under the ADEA.262 Other claims may present evidence of dis-
crimination against older women that implicates both sex and 
age bias, such as comments that an older woman is a "battle 
ax" "old war horse" "old hag" "Grandma" "little old lady" , " , , 
"witch", "Old Maid", "old prune", and so on; while these claims 
may be presented as pure sex discrimination. Attorneys must 
be cognizant of the potential that more than simply age or sex 
258. See id. (noting that plaintift's attorneys have a particular opportunity to edu-
cate courts about hybrid discrimination against mid-life to older women). 
259. See id. The WLDF STUDY points out that some lawyers may lack an under-
standing of how age and sex are connected for older women in limiting job opportuni-
ties. See id. 
260. See id. at 34. 
261. See Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1996). 
262. See Crawford, 96 F.3d at 832. 
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discrimination is involved in an older woman's discrimination 
claims in order to fully develop the evidence supporting a hy-
brid of age and sex discrimination where it exists.263 The bene-
fits derived from such potential evidence are that it may pro-
vide a stronger claim than that of age or sex discrimination 
standing alone because it better supports the evidence of dis-
crimination directed against an older woman, than evidence of 
pure age or sex discrimination can. Attorneys dealing with 
cases presenting evidence of the potential that both age and sex 
discrimination are involved in an older woman's claims must 
fully explore the potential that a hybrid of both exists before 
deciding to plead age or sex discrimination alone.264 
B. THE MURDOCK AND THOMPSON DECISIONS . DENYING 
RECOGNITION OF OLDER WOMEN AS A PROTECTED SUBCLASS 
UNDER TITLE VII AND THE FALLACY OF ADEQUATE SEPARATE 
PROTECTIONS FOR HYBRID DISCRIMINATION UNDER EITHER 
TITLE VII OR THE ADEA. 
The decisions in both Thompson and Murdock expressly re-
fuse to recognize older women as a protected subclass for pro-
tection under Title VII or the ADEA, explaining that neither 
federal, nor state law has extended protection to older women 
as "older women.n265 However, in relying on the lack of imme-
diate precedent for recognizing subset discrimination directed 
at older women, neither court actually analyzed the reasoning 
applicable to subset discrimination in order to determine 
whether or not that reasoning should be applied to those 
claims. 
Subset discrimination under Title VII, as first identified in 
Martin Marietta Corp., v. Phillips, involves allegations that an 
employer disparately treats a subclass within a protected class, 
rather than the protected class as a whole.266 Accordingly, 
263. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 34. 
264. See id. 
265. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 203-04; Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3. 
266. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (wherein the U.S. Supreme Court vacated sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendants and held that although not all women were af-
fected by the employer's practice of refusing to hire women with pre-school age chil-
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where "a Title VII plaintiff can show that she would have been 
offered the position if she were a man, she can show a prima 
facie case of discrimination, even if other women were offered 
the same position" (emphasis added).267 In Phillips, the "other 
women" offered such positions were not be similarly situated to 
plaintiff's alleging the disparate treatment in terms of their sex 
plus another characteristic being affected by the employer's 
practice.268 In determining whether there is a violation of Title 
VII, the plaintiff's class is defined as a "subclass of women (or 
men) [that are subjected to disparate treatment] based on ei-
ther (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a 
fundamental right. ~69 
Older women are clearly a subset of women within the pro-
tected class of "sex" under Title VII, and a subset of older em-
ployees within the protected class of "age" under the ADEA 
who are subjected to disparate treatment based upon their 
combined or hybrid identity as "older women." Accordingly, 
where an older woman can show that she would have been of-
fered a position if she were a man, she can show a prima facie 
case of discrimination, even if other women were offered the 
same position. This reasoning, applied here to "sex-plus-age" 
discrimination claims, is a major component of the theoretical 
underpinnings in the subset or "sex-plus" discrimination con-
text. There is no salient justification for denying the applica-
tion of subset discrimination to claims by older women as 
"older women" under Title VII since the reasoning underlying 
those claims is applicable in a "sex-plus-age" context. 
Moreover, an immutability argument is present under both 
Title VII and the ADEA for older women's status as "older 
women" that is comparable, albeit different in origin, to the 
dren, plaintiffs could still establish a violation of Title VII because similarly situated 
men were not disparately treated). See id. 
267. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 239. 
268. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543-44, (noting that although over 70% of applicants 
hired for the position at issue were women, plaintiffs could still state a claims for dis-
crimination under Title VII). See id. The women hired were not similarly situated to 
the plaintiffs in Phillips because they did not have pre-school age children. See id. 
269. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-40, explaining the rule that has emerged from 
Phillips and its progeny in analyzing "sex-plus· discrimination claims. See id. . 
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existence of an immutable identity for women of color recog-
nized under Title VII.270 In an allegation of employment dis-
crimination brought by an African-American woman based 
upon her status as a "black woman," courts have recognized 
that both components of a black woman's identity are immuta-
ble, and therefore create a subset of both Mrican-American and 
female employees for protection under Title VII.271 Similarly, 
an older woman's gender identity is clearly immutable and 
therefore not subject to change. However, an older woman's 
status as an "older woman" under both Title VII and the ADEA 
is an immutable identity that is not subject to change because 
once a woman reaches forty years of age, she becomes protected 
by the provisions of the ADEA for the rest of her life. There-
fore, whether an older woman is forty or eighty years of age, 
she will always be protected under the ADEA, and the protec-
tions afforded to her under Title VII because of her gender, 
likewise, are not subject to change. The immutability in an 
older woman's identity as an older woman not only strengthens 
the argument for the extension of "sex-plus" under Title VII to 
claims brought by older women, but moreover, provides support 
for the proposition that an "age-plus" theory is cognizable un-
der the ADEA. 
As distinguished from the claims in Kelly and Luce seeking 
recognition of "age-plus-disability" and "age-plus religion" dis-
crimination, an older woman's identity as an "older woman" is 
legally created by her admission into the protected group under 
the ADEA and cannot arise before she reaches forty.272 As a 
result, an older woman's status as an older woman in an em-
ployment context is both defmed and solidified by her entrance 
into the protected age group under the ADEA. On the other 
hand, the development of a disability or a religious belief can 
270. See supra notes 107-18 discussing "sex-plus" discrimination claims of women 
of color. See also supra note 15 for articles 'on the subject of combined race and sex 
discrimination. 
271. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032-33; supra notes 108-11, holding that black 
women could establish a discrimination claim absent discrimination against black men 
or white women. 
272. The ADEA protects persons who are forty or older. See 42 U.S.C. § 631(a) 
(1994). 
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theoretically occur at any time in a plaintiffs employment.273 
The ADEA should therefore expand its protections to cover 
older women as "older women" since her status is "born" or 
arises out of her inclusion in the protected classification under 
theADEA. 
The opinions in Thompson and Murdock expressed reserva-
tions about considering older women as a protected subclass for 
Title VII or the ADEA purposes because no authority existed 
upon which to fmd that a viable age "age-plus-sex" theory ex-
ists, and the court in Murdock concluded that judicial attempts 
to establish such a theory would amount to judicial 
legislation.274 But the problem of inadequate remedy for "spe-
cialized" forms of discrimination has been faced by other courts 
at one time or another. Those courts used the underlying ra-
tionales in Title VII or the ADEA to support new applications 
of existing theories in order to meet the needs of significant 
subsets of women and men whose claims of discrimination were 
not being adequately redressed by the then current structures 
available.275 Similarly, Title VII and the ADEA must continue 
to evolve and expand in order to meet the needs of persons pro-
tected by its provisions that experience subset discrimination 
on multiple basis, rather than just because of their age or sex. 
The rationales supporting the existence of the "sex-plus" doc-
trine also support its further extension to "age-plus-sex" dis-
crimination under Title VII and the ADEA. Accordingly, courts 
273. Generally there is a much stronger correlation between age and disability than 
age plus religion or other factors where degenerative conditions increase with a per-
son's age. See, e.g., Blonder, 1992 WL 44404 (discussing age and sex discrimination 
claims brought by an older woman on the basis of an employer practice that required 
the largely female nursing staff, but not the largely male physician staff to undergo 
rubella inoculations and the relationship between inoculations and arthritic conditions 
that are triggered by the vaccinations in adult women that increase with their ages). 
The correlation between age and an age-related disability however, does not arise out 
of admittance into the protected age group to the same extent that one's status as an 
older woman does. This argument is not put forth here to argue that a claim for age-
plus-disability should not cognizable under the ADEA, but only to illustrate the differ-
ences in such claims. 
274. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 203-04; MuTYkJek, 1992 WL 393158 at *3. 
275. See e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d 234, supra note 92 (establishing hostile environment 
claim by utilizing the "terms, conditions and privileges language" in Title VI!); Jeffries, 
615 F.2d 1032 supra note 108-11 and accompanying text (first holding that black 
women could establish a claim under Titile VII for discrimination absent discrimina-
tory treatment directed at white females or males of color). 
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should apply that reasoning to sex-pIus-age discrimination 
claims under either statute. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Judges and attorneys can consistently recognize the poten-
tial for hybrid discrimination in the claims brought by older 
women by considering the ways in which the evidence of dis-
crimination may support a hybrid of both age and sex. The 
following section discusses approaches that courts and attor-
neys should adopt in analyzing and presenting hybrid dis-
crimination claims. 
A. COURTS SHOULD USE A HYBRID APPROACH TO ANALYZE 
HYBRID AGE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Instead of following a separate basis model, some courts 
have adopted a hybrid approach to analyze dual claims of age 
and sex discrimination.276 In contrast to a separate basis ap-
proach, a hybrid approach considers how the evidence of one 
type of discrimination, such as age bias, supports an inference 
that another type of discrimination, such as sex bias exists.277 
Under this approach, courts consider the evidence of other 
types of discrimination as demonstrative of a workplace that is 
generally infected or tainted with impermissible bias.278 
A hybrid approach provides flexibility and 
comprehensiveness with regard to hybrid claims of sex and age 
discrimination because it considers the ways in which the evi-
dence of discrimination overlaps, instead of using an either/or 
approach. Thus, courts can see the larger context of the dis-
276. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 21. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416 (holding 
that racial slurs directed at Black female employees that were tainted with sex dis-
crimination sufficient to create a sexually discriminatory environment); Spanier v. 
Morrison's Management Servs., 822 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that sexist 
statements by plaintifl's supervisor supported its fmdings of age discrimination); Hoth 
v. Grinnell College, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 528 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (holding that 
although the plaintiff was not yet forty and thus not entitled to the protections under 
the ADEA, her age discrimination allegations were too closely tied with her claims 
under other anti-discrimination laws to dismiss). 
277. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 16. 
278. See id. at 21. 
54
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss2/2
1998] HYBRID SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION 169 
crimination claims by considering the evidence for analysis in 
light of all of the claims presented. A hybrid approach is par-
ticularly appropriate when the evidence of discrimination is 
equally compelling and applicable to both claims, in which 
case, the evidence should not be mechanically allocated to only 
one claim or the other. The decisions in Sischo-Nownejad v. 
Merced Community College Dist.,279 Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 280 
and Hicks v. Gates Rubber CO.281 illustrate a hybrid approach 
and how plaintiffs can prevail in cases where courts adopt this 
approach. 
In Sischo-Nownejad, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reconsidered the grant of a summary judgment motion for 
defendant, Merced Community College District ("Merced") in 
which the district court determined that plaintiff failed to es-
tablish a case of intentional discrimination.282 At the time the 
action arose, the plaintiff, Edina Sischo-Nownejad, was fifty-
eight years old.283 Sischo-Nownejad's employment as an art 
instructor at Merced commenced in 1968.284 The plaintiff al~ 
leged sex and age discrimination consisting of a series of estab-
lished practices followed by the college for all faculty members 
except Sischo-Nownejad.285 Such practices included failing to 
consult with Sischo-Nownejad about the courses she wished to 
teach, reassigning classes to others that Sischo-Nownejad de-
veloped and taught for years, and giving her undesirable 
teaching assignments.286 Moreover, the college failed to consult 
with Sischo-Nownejad about her need for supplies and did not 
to provide her with any supplies from 1982 to 1988, while it 
provided supplies for all other faculty members during this pe-
279. 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991). 
280. 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). 
281. 833 F.2d 1406 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
282. Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1106-07. The claims on appeal included sex and 
age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, equal protection violations, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and sex and age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act. See id. at 1108. 
283. See id. at 1106. 
284. See id. at 1107. 
285. See id. at 1106-07. 
286. See Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. The college ordinarily based its as-
signments and scheduling classes on faculty member input. The senior faculty is nor-
mally given the fIrst chance to teach classes they have developed or taught for long 
periods of time. See id. 
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riod.287 The enrollment in Sischo-Nownejad's courses was con-
stantly monitored, although enrollment of classes taught by 
other instructors was not.288 When Sischo-Nownejad com-
plained about course assignments, the college did not take ac-
tion to facilitate her request.289 On the other hand, while con-
ducting investigations into allegations of misconduct by Sischo-
Nownejad, the ethics committee violated its own policies.290 
The school repeatedly criticized Sischo-Nownejad by alleg-
ing that she failed to fulfill her required office hours under her 
contract, rarely attended division meetings, and was absent 
from her scheduled office hours.291 The college also denied Sis-
cho-Nownejad's request for leave.292 Sischo-Nownejad re-
quested reconsideration of this decsion.293 The college failed to 
respond and after seven months, she withdrew her request for 
reconsideration.294 Sischo-Nownejad's proof also included 
statements from her department chairs that indicated age and 
sex bias.295 The statements included references to Sischo-
Nownejad as an "old warhorse", "a women's libber", and re-
peated characterizations of her students as "little old ladies 
[who] have their own art studio.Wl96 Finally, Sischo-Nownejad 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
289. See id. 
290. See Sisclw·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. After Sischo-Nownejad made a verbal 
complaint to the dean of the college about her course assignments being unilaterally 
taken over by the division head of the art department, she submitted a written com-
plaint to the dean and sent a copy of the letter to the president of the college and the 
board of trustees. The art department head responded by filing an ethics complaint 
against Sischo-Nownejad, alleging that Sischo-Nownejad charged him with unprofes-
sional conduct by her actions, in distributing the letter to the president and board of 
trustees, in violation of the established procedures for lodging such complaints. The 
department head also charged that Sischo-Nownejad violated art department proce-
dures by copying and selling art department works, as well as physically abusing an-
other instructor. In response, the ethics committee, in violation of established policy, 
conducted an investigation of the charges in open senate, rather than closed committee, 
and formally reprimanded Sischo-Nownejad in a letter included in her personnel file. 
See id. 
291. See Sischo·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. Sischo-Nownejad denied each allega-
tion as untrue. See id. 
292. See id. 
293. See id. at 1107-08. 
294. [d. at 1108. 
295. See Sisclw·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1108, 1112. 
296. See id. at 1108. 
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presented two letters from the president of the college and a 
statement from the dean of personnel urging Sischo-Nownejad 
to retire.297 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the evidence of discrimination 
under Title VII and the ADEA simultaneously?98 In reviewing 
the facts, the Ninth Circuit relied on Lowe v. City of Monrovia 
("Lowe").299 
In Lowe, a black woman applied for a position with the 
Monrovia police department.3OO The personnel manager re-
sponded that the department had "no black or women officers" 
and therefore, had "no facilities" in which to serve her.30l 
Lowe's initial complaint alleged both race and sex discrimina-
tion but the district court dismissed the sex claim because it 
was time barred.302 The district court concluded that the per-
sonnel manager's statement did not raise an inference of race 
discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.303 On 
review, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the state-
ment, taken in conjunction with the fact that Monrovia did not 
employ black police officers, created an inference of race dis-
crimination sufficient to establish a prima facie case.304 The 
Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the overlaps in the evi-
dence of race and sex bias apparent in the statement by the 
personnel manager. The Ninth Circuit recognized, however, 
297. See id. 
298. See id. at 1109-12. 
299. 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). 
300. See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1002. 
301. See id. The personnel manager suggested that Lowe seek a position with the 
Los Angeles Police Department where they were "begging for women and minorities." 
[d. at 1002-03 
302. See id. at 1003. The district court ruled that Lowe's sex claim was time barred 
because Lowe failed to allege sex discrimination in her amended EEOC complaint. See 
id. 
303. See Lowe, 775 F.2d. at 1003. Presumably, the lower court attributed the Mfa_ 
cilities comment" to Lowe's sex, rather than her race. 
304. See id. at 1007. Had Lowe's sex discrimination claim survived summary 
judgment, it is reasonable to assume that the Ninth Circuit would have applied the 
same reasoning because the department also had no women officers and the personnel 
manager's statement implicated Lowe's status as a woman and an African-American. 
Moreover, the question of whether or not the statement should be attributed to her sex, 
race, or a hybrid of both, is not an appropriate consideration for summary judgment 
because it potentially involves a disputed question of fact. 
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that the comment could have applied equally to Lowe's claim of 
race or sex biases and applied the statement accordingly to the 
remaining race claim.305 
The Ninth Circuit followed the Lowe approach to analyze 
Sischo-Nownejad's case. The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
Sischo-Nownejad's evidence could be attributed to her status 
both as an older employee and as a woman.306 In reversing the 
district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the statements that 
Sischo-Nownejad was an "old warhorse", "women's libber", and 
the repeated references to Sischo-Nownejad and her students 
as "little old ladies", in conjunction with the overall treatment 
she received, supported both the age and sex claims.307 Ac-
cordingly the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for trial on Sis-
cho-Nownejad's age and sex discrimination claims.3°S 
Similarly, in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., a race and sex dis-
crimination case brought by an African-American woman, the 
Tenth Circuit recognized that the evidence of race and sex dis-
crimination against plaintiff could be aggregated for analysis in 
order to demonstrate a violation of Title VII. 309 The plaintiff, 
Marguerite Hicks, worked for Gates Rubber Company ("Gates") 
as a security guard for less than a year.3lO Hicks was the only 
305. See id. at 1009. In concluding that Lowe's evidence was sufficient to meet the 
prima facie burden of establishing race discrimination, the Lowe court stated: 
According to plaintiffs sworn affidavit, Logans, the Personnel Division 
Manager for the City made a point of telling Lowe that the Monrovia 
police force had no women and no Blacks. Logans then encouraged 
Lowe to apply for a position as a police officer in Los Angeles rather 
than Monrovia. Logans explained that Lowe should do so because the 
Los Angeles police force was "literally begging for minorities and espe-
cially females." One clear inference that could reasonably be drawn 
from this statement is that the Monrovia police force was not begging 
for-or even interested in-such applicants. (emphasis added). 
1d. at 1009. 
306. See Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111-12. 
307. 1d. at 1112. 
308. See id. at 1114. 
309. See 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1987). The Appellate Court explained that 
aggregation was permissible because "Title VII prohibits an employer from discrimi-
nating against any individual because of race or because of sex." 1d. The Hicks court 
then cited Jeffries, 615 F.2d, at 1032, wherein the Jeffries court explained that "the use 
of the word 'or' evidences Congress' intent to prohibit employment discrimination based 
on any or all of the listed characteristics," in arguing that aggregation of the evidence 
to determine if race and sex bias existed is possible. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416. 
310. See id. at 1408. 
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African-American woman employed by Gates and one of only 
two African-American employees.3ll 
During Hicks' employment, she complained that improper 
racial and sexual remarks and conduct created a hostile envi-
ronment.312 Supervisory and regular personnel made racial 
remarks referring to African-Americans as "niggers," and 
"coons. ,,313 Coworkers also referred to Hicks as a "lazy nigger" 
and "Buffalo Butt. »314 The unwelcome sexual conduct involved 
a supervisor rubbing Hicks' thigh and grabbing her breast 
while jumping on top of her.315 The district court held that 
Hicks' claims did not establish a hostile environment based 
upon her race.31S 
Although the Tenth Circuit sustained the lower court's 
findings that Gates did not create a hostile environment for 
black employees, it nevertheless concluded that the evidence of 
racial harassment could be combined with the evidence of sex 
bias to determine whether a sexual harassment hostile envi-
ronment existed.317 The court relied on the reasoning in Jef-
fries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n which held that 
a black female could establish sex and race bias in the absence 
of discriminatory treatment against black males or white fe-
males. 318 The Hicks court then remanded the case to the lower 
court for consideration of Hicks' sexual harassment hostile en-
vironment claim.319 
Sischo-Nownejad, Lowe, and Hicks demonstrate the benefits 
to plaintiffs when courts use a hybrid approach to analyze the 
evidence of discrimination in cases containing the potential 
that more than one type of discrimination is involved in the 
claim. Moreover, a hybrid approach allows courts to consider 
311. See id. at 1408-09. 
312. See id. at 1409-11. 
313. See id. at 1409. 
314. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1409. 
315. See id. at 1409-10. 
316. See id. at 1411. 
317. Seeid. at 1416-17. For a discussion of sexual harassment hostile environment, 
see supra notes 92-95 accompanying text. 
318. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416, citing Jeffries, 615 F.2d, at 1032. 
319. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1419. 
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the ways in which the plaintiffs complete identity factors into 
the treatment she receives. A hybrid approach encourages 
greater scrutiny by courts of the overlaps in the evidence of sex 
and age discrimination as indicative of multi-factor, rather 
than single factor discrimination. This approach may increase 
a plaintiffs chances of prevailing when hybrid discrimination is 
present. 
B. COURTS AND ATTORNEYS MUST USE A COMPREHENSIVE 
MODEL TO AssESS HYBRID AGE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
This comment discussed several obvious ways to address the 
problems of hybrid discrimination. The first step begins with 
attorneys who handle hybrid discrimination cases. Attorneys 
must consider and investigate whether an older woman's 
status as an "older woman", rather than just her age or sex, 
played a part in the treatment she experienced. Next, attor-
neys should plead both sex and age discrimination whenever 
the facts suggest the possibility that a hybrid of both age and 
sex exists, rather than take an either/or approach to pleading 
these claims. Moreover, lawyers should adopt the "sex-plus" 
pleading model under Title VII, in addition to alleging age dis-
crimination under the ADEA, whenever an older woman's 
status as an "older woman" contributes to the discrimination 
she experiences. This pleading posture focuses a court's atten-
tion on the evidence of discrimination directed at older women, 
absent general age and sex discrimination. However, because 
all courts have not yet accepted older women as a protected 
subclass under Title VII, a separate allegation of age discrimi-
nation is still necessary in order to avoid the possibility of mul-
tiple summary adjudication discussed in Arnett.320 
Finally, courts should adopt a hybrid approach to analyze 
sex and age discrimination claims, whenever the evidence of 
discrimination suggests a hybrid. A hybrid approach is neces-
320. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238; see also supra notes 130-46. See also Mur· 
dock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3; see also supra notes 125-28, wherein the State Appellate 
Court refused to consider the evidence of combined age and sex discrimination directed 
at older women and accordingly held that no evidence of pure age or sex discrimination 
was presented. 
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sary in these cases because it allows a court to consider how 
the proof of discrimination directed at an older woman sup-
ports both the sex and age discrimination allegations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and judges faced with hybrid age and sex claims 
must consider the particular issues that arise in these claims 
by older women. Alternative analytical models, such as "sex-
plus" and "hybrid approach analysis" are necessary to effec-
tively resolve hybrid discrimination claims. There are chal-
lenges inherent in the next century where older women will 
become an expanded group of older employees and potential 
litigants under both Title VII and the ADEA for hybrid claims 
of discrimination. The reality requires the development of a 
comprehensive approach to the problem of hybrid discrimina-
tion. This comment provides but a starting point for that de-
velopment. 
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